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 The hypothesis that language discrimination contributes to protest and/or 
rebellion is tested.  Constitutional language policy regarding administrative/judicial, 
educational and other matters is measured on three separate scales developed for this 
study; the status of each minority group’s language under its country’s policy is measured 
by another set of scales.  Protest and rebellion variables are taken from Gurr's Minorities 
at Risk study. 
 Findings include an indication that group language status contributes positively to 
protest and rebellion until a language attains moderate recognition by the government, at 
which point status develops a negative relationship with protest and rebellion, and an 
indication that countries with wider internal variations in their treatment of language 
groups experience higher levels of protest and rebellion on the part of minority groups. 
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Finding the Question 
 The current question arose as a byproduct of an investigation into “official 
English” as a public issue in the United States.  Research of federal court cases dealing 
with official language issues turned up a number of court transcripts dealing with appeals 
of federal immigration authorities’ denials of refugee petitions.  In one appeal after 
another, the phrase “My language is not the official language of my country” was 
followed by accounts of discrimination and various forms of alleged maltreatment at the 
hands of the petitioner’s government.  The naming of language policy as a contributing 
cause of a political exit decision – an example of the human “flight” reaction to a 
perceived danger – provoked my curiosity about other possible reactions to 
discrimination associated with language policy.  Would these reactions fall into the 
“fight” category?  What type of language policy produces what type of protest or 
rebellion?  In scientific form, the question became:  What is the relationship between 
language policy and protest or rebellion? 
 Language, in the performance of its most elemental function, provides a means of 
communication between one person and another; history has taught us, however, that 
language assumes roles of varying complexity in the ongoing interactions between 
persons, linguistic groups and ultimately states.  For some, language is a matter of 
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convenience or of social manners; for others a cultural icon which is remembered fondly 
along with the great-grandparents who assimilated themselves into the linguistic 
majority, and for still others, an inextricable part of the same package as freedom and 
self-determination.  These images of language provide numerous aspects of language to 
study.  Linguists examine language itself – the meanings of words, the grammatical rules 
– and the relationship of one language to another.  Sociolinguists explore the link 
between language and identity and how individuals make language choices.  Educators 
study the way in which language is learned and, correspondingly, the methods by which 
language can be taught.  Political scientists are primarily concerned with the part which 
language plays in power exchanges, especially as language differences constitute one 
component of the underlying “otherness” forming the basis for ethnic conflict. 
 News articles (e.g. Collins 1997) regularly attribute ethnic conflict, protest and 
rebellion to language issues.  There seems to be little controversy in political science 
literature over whether conflict over language issues can lead to civil conflict or to protest 
and rebellion. But is it that simple?  Weinstein (1983, 15) sums it up in a statement that 
begins innocuously enough but reveals undecided issues:  “Disagreement over the official 
language of a country and the medium of instruction in schools (which can be a 
disagreement about who shall participate in power, wealth, and prestige) is a source of 
conflict between ethnic groups, regions, and states.”  Right away we are given a clue that 
the reasons for language conflict and its persistence might or might not be the language 
itself, that language conflict can occur along several dimensions and that paths from 












Language Policy, Protest and Rebellion 
 The connection between language policy and protest or rebellion has been much 
discussed but seldom tested.  Language policy has come to be taken for granted as a 
contributing factor to minority group protest and rebellion on the basis of claims by 
minority linguistic groups that language is a major issue.  Previous research has generally 
not concentrated on the question of whether and how language policy influences protest 
and rebellion but rather on aspects related to language or to protest and rebellion ranging 
from the development of language policy to the phenomenon of ethnic conflict as a 
whole.  Fortunately, there are studies of language policy (both as an independent and a 
dependent variable) and studies of protest and rebellion which should provide valuable 
background to the current research, along with a few that link variables related to 
language with variables related to protest and rebellion.  Examples of the latter include 
studies of linguistic heterogeneity or cultural discrimination as related to conflict.  
Several theoretical proposals include studies of language and its accompanying values 
and typologies of language situations (language regimes) and language policy.  These 
“edge pieces” to the puzzle of language and politics appear to be sufficiently developed 
to enable us to begin to fill in a new area of research concentration. 
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 Several studies whose main focus is not language policy and protest or rebellion 
contain references to a connection between the two.  For example, although Laitin 
(1977, 18) states that public reaction against a choice of official language in Africa was 
not generally intense at the time of his study, Dasgupta (1990, 227) observes that 
conflicts over language policy in India have included violence or coercion against 
political authority.  In his case study of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India, 
Warikoo (1996, 13) expresses surprise that the Kashmiri secessionist movement has 
focused on religion as a rallying factor rather than following the usual pattern of using 
language discrimination as common ground.  Pattanaik (Undated, 1) cites ethnic identity 
of marginalized groups as a source of state instability, thus implying that anything 
leading to an ethnic group’s perception of discrimination can lead to protest or rebellion 
or other conflict generated by that group.  On the milder side, Laitin (1977, 107) 
mentions that language issues in Africa have been known to generate letters to 
newspapers, and Edwards (1985, 90) points out that “successful language 




 Schiffman (1998, 11) decries the lack of comparative research in language policy 
literature, an opinion borne out by the present search for relevant literature.  Most studies 
in this field have concentrated on one or a few countries and have employed the case 
study method.  Invaluable as case studies can be, there has been little empirical cross-
country research to coordinate case study results.  Despite this disadvantage, an excellent 
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foundation for further study of language policy is found in Weinstein’s (1983) review of 
the existing status of language as a political issue.  His discussion covers, among other 
things, the development of language policy, language choices by individuals and the 
influence of language policy on participation and development.  Heine (1990) analyzed 
language policies in Kenya and their relationship to sociolinguistic problems.  
Generalizing to other countries in the region, Heine attributes a portion of the 
socioeconomic problems faced by African countries to sociolinguistic problems which 
can only be aggravated by continued discord between language policy and language use 
(Heine 1990, 167, 181).  Several authors, including Koenig (1998), Kloss (1968) and 
Schiffman (1996), have produced typologies of language policy which are helpful in 
developing a language policy measurement for the present study. 
 
Language Policy and Political Development or Political Regime 
 Fierman’s (1990) case study of Uzbekistan and Dasgupta’s (1990) similar study 
of India provide insights into the relationship between language issues and political 
development.  Koenig (1998) analyzed language conflicts in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
providing a structural explanation of language conflict and arguing that language policy 
that is multicultural in nature will be the most successful in maintaining the social 
integration needed for democratic governance (Koenig 1998, 2). 
 Grandguillaume (1990, 150) analyzed the effect of language policy in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia on the legitimacy of a political regime or political actions.  He 
concluded that language policy actions which are taken to strengthen legitimacy may 
rather weaken it.  As legitimacy depends on the public’s perception of a regime, the 
 
 6 
public’s reaction to language policy would appear to be the intermediate player in this 
process.  Bodomo (1996, 3) argues, based on his case study of language in Ghana, that 
successful development in its broadest sense (socio-cultural, political and economic) “can 
only be achieved through the use of the mother-tongues or the languages indigenous to 
the society.” 
 
Language Policy and Ethnic Conflict 
 Rustow (1968, 105) uses several countries from his cross-polity study as 
examples for his argument that “government policy will be a major factor in solving or 
exacerbating existing problems of unity and disunity.”  Brass (1991) studied the 
development and implementation of language policy of India as compared to that in the 
Soviet Union and various European countries.  Chaklader’s (1990) study of the state of 
West Bengal in India (Chaklader 1990, 105)  and Esman’s (1990, 186, 200) analysis of 
the relationship between language policy and language use in Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines found direct implications for the present study 
in their conclusions that language policy in a state with ethnic minorities can either spark 
grievances or depoliticize language.  Similarly, Laitin’s (1977) case study of Somalia led 
him to conclude that language policy can either contribute to or detract from democratic 
participation and political equality. 
 
Protest and Rebellion 
 Linguistic heterogeneity as an independent variable has been measured by Banks 
and Textor (1968) and analyzed in various other cross-polity studies including that by 
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Fishman (1989), who found that linguistic heterogeneity did not appear to contribute 
significantly to civil strife (Fishman 1989, 605-26).  More on target for the present study, 
Gurr’s (1993) Minorities at Risk Project involved an analysis of protest and rebellion 
behavior by 233 politically active communal groups worldwide for the time period of 
1945-89 against an extensive set of independent variables including composite variables 
for cultural differentials and cultural discrimination.  These composite variables were 
derived from individual variables including, respectively and among other elements, the 
speaking of a language different from the dominant group and the existence of language 
restrictions in media and education.  As the original Minorities at Risk study was the 
basis for an ongoing and regularly updated research project (University of Maryland 
1999), it provides certain relevant data which will be discussed later in connection with 
the model presented in this study. 
 
Language Attitudes and Language Use 
 Fishman (1997,7-8) gathered statements of “positive ethnolinguistic 
consciousness” regarding 76 languages which were made within the last couple of 
centuries by speakers of those languages.  He then proceeded to analyze the statements as 
they relate to various themes, including that of ethnic identity.  His research provides a 
background for exploring the characteristics of language which might make language 
policy politically inflammatory.  Based on a review of the literature concerning language 
use in Africa, Myers-Scotton (1990) discusses language strategy by elites for purposes of 
maintaining power.  Language as government power is explored in Lutz’s (1995) case 
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study of Indonesian language policy in East Timor and in Esman’s (1990) study of 
southeast Asia. 
 To summarize, the literature to date has provided suggestive (albeit not 
conclusive) evidence that language is an important factor in ethnic conflict and that 
language policy can contribute to or help to prevent such conflict.   What previous 
research has not provided is an empirical measurement of language policy and an 













In order to build a theory of language policy, protest and rebellion, we must have 
a coherent understanding of what language policy is and how it relates to factors which 
are known contributors to protest and rebellion.  Even before that, a discussion of 
language itself would seem to be an appropriate foundation for an understanding of 
language policy and an understanding of possible language-related bases for protest and 
rebellion.  Edwards (1985, 17) is careful to note that “…there can be a distinction, within 
a language, between what I have called communicative and symbolic functions….The 
basic distinction here is between language in its ordinarily understood sense as a tool of 
communication, and language as an emblem of groupness, as a symbol, a rallying-point.” 
 
Language as Identity and as Symbol 
 “Language by which peoples express their values through epic poetry or 
contemporary song as well as through prose, journalism, and petty conversation is 
worth protecting in the view of most peoples.  Protection of a script condemned 
by others as inefficient, a grammer [sic] seen by others as inconsistent, a sound 
system impossible for others to master, and a lexicon of archaisms – one or all 
link the individual with a tradition, a deity, a past, an identity, a community, and a 
future without which life has no meaning.”  (Weinstein 1983, 134-35) 
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This emotional impact of language is explained philosophically by Fishman 
(1997, 36-37):  “Because the kinship link stretches from antiquity through the present 
into the distant future, the language that is associated with kinship becomes a bond and a 
bequest linking the generations….The beloved language is the ongoing extension, 
realization and implementation of that bond, stretching over time immemorial.  Without 
it, it is implied, there could be no intergenerational continuity via early and proper 
socialization of the young.  Without it, there would literally be no life worth living.”  
Schiffman (1996, 73) presents the Navajo people as the ultimate example of language 
loyalty due to beliefs about the role of language in the creation of the world:  “For the 
Navajo, death of their language would obviously mean not only the death of Navajo 
culture but the destruction of the world.  For the Navajo, language maintenance is 
equivalent to holding the world together and avoiding utter chaos.” 
 Fishman (1989, 32) expounds on the nature of language:  “By its very nature 
language is the quintessential symbol, the symbol par excellence….All language …refers 
to,…expresses, …evokes ‘something’ in addition to itself.  However, in the process of 
symbolizing it tends also to become valued in itself.”  Warikoo (Undated, 1) refers to 
language as “the most potent cultural marker providing for group identity.”  Edwards 
(1985, 283-4) agrees that “…language…is a highly visible marker of group identity; 
indeed, for many it is the essential marker….” but goes on to assert that “language is not 
always essential for continued identity….”  He argues that language is used as a symbol 
of identity largely because it is such an easily available factor.  Fishman (1989, 32) 
concurs:  “Anything can become symbolic of ethnicity…, but since language is the prime 
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symbol system to begin with and since it is commonly relied upon so heavily…to enact, 
celebrate and ‘call forth’ all ethnic activity, the likelihood that it will be recognized and 
singled out as symbolic of ethnicity is great indeed.”  Laitin (1992, 93) remarks 
practically that “…the issue of language has too much symbolic power to be ignored by 
leaders seeking votes, popular support, or legitimacy.” 
Quite a few scholars argue that language is a matter of choice.  Laitin (1992, 26) 
questions the inevitability of language ties, pointing out that people have been voluntarily 
adopting new cultural identities for centuries.  Paul Brass (1974, 45) states that 
“…objective marks of group identity, such as language or religion, are not ‘givens’ from 
which group identities naturally spring, but are themselves subject to variation.”  Carol 
Eastman (1984, 260-61) argues similarly:  “When we stop using the language of our 
ethnic group, only the language use aspect of our identity changes; the primordial sense 
of who we are and what group we think we belong to for the remainder remains intact.”  
Laitin (1992, 52) explains some of the contradiction in this way:  “People are willing to 
learn language other than their mother tongues as instruments for the fulfillment of 
economic or social goals.  As the newly learned language(s) begin [sic] to replace the 
mother tongue in a widening circle of social domain, however, many people feel a sense 
of loss, of alienation from their roots, of betrayal.” 
Fishman (1989, 7), although an impassioned philosophical defender of vanishing 
languages, brings a certain closure to the debate over language-as-identity vs. language-
as-choice with a down-to-earth statement that has direct implications for protest and 
rebellion.  “The point is not whether ethnic boundaries and their link to language are real 
 
 12 
or specious, genuine or created, valid or exaggerated, self-serving or altruistic, 
ethnocentric or objective, dividing or unifying.  The point is that ethnicity is an inevitable 
dimension of aggregative definition and action as well as occasionally a deeply felt, a 
deeply moving and a deeply meaningful one.”  Laitin (1992, 50) makes the same point:   
“Because symbols evoked by hearing one’s own (or a foreign) language have deep 
psychological resonance among constituents, politicians cannot be merely technocratic 
about its use.  And because people feel that it matters, in an important way it does 
matter.”  In relationship to protest and rebellion, a person’s reasons for holding a 
particular characteristic to be of value are not important; what is important is that a 
person who places great value on something is more likely to take action to defend it 
from a perceived threat.  
 
Language Attitudes 
One result of the use of language as a symbol is the reaction of both insiders and 
outsiders to that symbol.  Fishman (1989, 251) argues that “…languages are not liked or 
disliked in a vacuum, but rather liked or disliked as symbolic of values, of peoples, of 
ideologies, of behaviors.”  A good example of this is Esman’s (1990, 190) finding that 
“Chinese [in Malaysia] regard Chinese medium education as a means of preserving 
Chinese culture; Malays regard it as a transparent means of evading the national language 
policy and as a potential source of dual loyalty and even of political subversion.” Lutz 
(1995, 4) describes the language policy of East Timor as being tied to education policy 
and in turn to security issues. 
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Language is not only linked directly to ethnic identity; it is also linked indirectly 
to ethnic identity through its link to other cultural characteristics.  For example, Edwards 
(1985, 66), Laitin (1977, 89-96) and Ager (1996, 1) describe links between language and 
religion.  Part of Grandguillaume’s (1990) argument is that language is inextricably 
linked to other cultural references.  His examples include the representation of Islamic 
Arab identity by the written form of Koranic Arabic; tribe and family identity by the oral 
maternal languages of the Berber language group and change, alternatives and modernity 
by the use of French (Grandguillaume 1990, 151-2).  In the same vein, Schiffman 
(1996, 5) develops an argument “that language policy is ultimately grounded in linguistic 
culture, that is, the set of behaviours, assumptions, cultural forms, prejudices, folk belief 
systems, attitudes, stereotypes, ways of thinking about language, and religio-historical 
circumstances associated with a particular language” and points out (Schiffman 1996, 24) 
that linguistic and religious conflicts are each exacerbated by the other.  A historical 
study of language policy in the United States led Leibowitz (1976, 463) to conclude that 
“decisions to impose English reflected the popular attitudes toward the particular ethnic 
group and….were always coupled with other discriminatory legislation and practices in 
other fields.”  Regarding protest and rebellion as responses to language policy, he argues 
(Leibowitz 1976, 473) that “it was the act of imposition itself which created the reaction 
by the minority group rather than the substantive effects of the policy.”  O’Barr 
(1976b, 7) refers in general terms to “grassroots mobilization which is in itself…a 
reaction to language policy.” 
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If people’s reactions to a particular language are based on their perception of what  
that language represents, perhaps actions by a state government which result in a 
particular language policy are based on similar perceptions.  On the other side of the 
process, the reactions of linguistic minorities to language policies they consider 
restrictive are very likely to be based on the minority groups’ perceptions of the belief 
systems which formed the language policy.  Schiffman (1996, 22) argues that 
“…language policies do not evolve ex nihilo; they are not taken off a shelf, dusted off, 
and plugged into a particular polity; rather, they are cultural constructs, and are rooted in 
and evolve from historical elements of many kinds, some explicit and overt, some 
implicit and covert.  It is in the covert areas that we need to seek the origins of the overt 
facets of a policy, not vice versa.”  An overt policy may have its roots in unwritten 
custom, and those roots can be recognized and either appreciated or resented by the 
linguistic minority. 
  
Functions of Language Policy 
 Language policy is often promoted by the state as an aid to communication; 
Weinstein (1983, 37) notes, however, that the state is not so much concerned with 
whether private citizens can communicate with each other as with whether the state can 
communicate its nonlinguistic policies to private citizens in a broad enough fashion to 
make its laws and regulations well known.  Myers-Scotton (1990, 29) argues for another 
function of language policy, in that “Any language policy, almost by definition, is 
restrictive….[T]he function of policies is to designate.  Language policies afford speakers 
of designated linguistic varieties potential mobility and meaningful participation in 
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government and the economy; that is, they designate the mobile.”  As stated by Esman 
(1990, 185), “Official language choice …reflects the relative status of competing 
language and by inference of the ethnic groups they represent…[and]…confers 
differential practical advantages or handicaps on ethnic groups and on their members in 
economic and educational competition.”  These comments lead us to Weinstein’s 
definition of the politics of language (1983, 11) as “the relation between the distribution 
of language skills on the one hand and economic and political power and high status or 
prestige on the other in a society with more than one variety of language.”  Bretton’s 
(1976, 435) conclusion is similar:  “Language…serves to secure class advantages and 
maintain class distinctions.”  Language policy, then, sets one of the parameters for the 
distribution of power.  Leibowitz (1976, 449) states it clearly:  “…language is primarily a 
means of control.” 
 
Language Policy and Ethnic Group Relations 
 Fishman (1968, 45) argues that “Language differences are not in themselves 
divisive.  Mutual attitudes of linguistic groups help determine the effect of such 
differences.”  Among several hypotheses set forth by Esman (1990,  186-7) are two 
which are particularly relevant to the question at hand:  (1) “…in contemporary 
postcolonial states… language choices directly affect the terms of coexistence among 
ethnic groups and of relationships between them and the state” and (2) “those language 
regimes which reflect efforts to accommodate the sensitivities and aspirations of 
component ethnic groups are more likely to facilitate the emergence of political 
community."  (In the interest of consistency, it should be noted here that Esman’s use of 
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the term “language regimes” is equivalent to the general use of “language policy” and 
does not appear to match Pool’s (1990) definition of language regimes.)  The intervening 
factor in the second hypothesis (Esman 1990, 200) is that “an accommodative language 
regime…can depoliticize language.”  State and government policy “play a role in ethnic 
identity formation or decline and affect competition of ethnic group elites”  (Brass 1991, 
241).  Varennes (1998, 277) speaks of “the unique position of language as a source of 
ethnic conflict” due to its economic and emotional links.  Bretton (1976,445) observes 
that language issues can be used either to split or to unify the people of a state and 
concludes emphatically that “Language may then indeed be the most explosive issue 
universally and over time” (Bretton 1976, 447). 
O’Barr (1976a, 21) is careful to emphasize that “Language merely 
symbolizes…regional cultural differences….[I]f language were not available…we 
suspect that another basis for regional politics would be found….The real issues are 
political, not linguistic; and their solutions must lie in the resolution of differentials in 
power relations.”  In his cross-polity analysis, Fishman (1989, 622-3) concluded that 
linguistic heterogeneity does not in itself contribute significantly to civil strife but can be 
exploited to mobilize groups experiencing deprivation, authoritarianism and 
modernization, which appear to be the central contributors to such strife.  Lutz (1995, 1) 
refers to language as part of the dynamics involved in government action against minority 
groups; if true, it would appear logical that action in the reverse direction is also 




Language and Access 
“It is clear why blood is drawn over language in certain situations:  language is 
the key, or the set of keys, needed to unlock the gates of access to survival kits – 
employment, advancement, social security, physical security”  (Bretton 1976, 444).  
Closely linked to this idea of access is the perception of the intent to prevent access, a 
byproduct of what Myers-Scotton (1990, 25) calls “elite closure” and defines as “a 
strategy by which those persons in power maintain their powers and privileges via 
language choices.”  Bretton (1976, 445) in turn supports this interpretation:  “Language, 
rule, caste and class are part of a chain which secures positions of power and influence 
for some and excludes others.”  Varennes (1998, 121) concurs:  “By making language a 
predominant factor in access to employment and education opportunities…a government 
directly affects the political power structures of the state.”  In their analysis of South 
African language policy, Reitzes and Crawhall (1998, 4) state that “Language rights are 
arguably the most important rights guaranteed by the Constitution, as the protection of 
equality, justice, access to information and state resources are largely dependent on 
communication in languages in which people are competent.”  Weinstein (1983, 6) 
argues that the greatest potential for conflict arises when “a majority of the population 
uses one language in its spoken and possibly written forms for most of its daily activities 
while another language, unknown to the majority, is used for government.” 
 Weinstein (1983, 82) speaks of a broad concept of participation as including 
“sharing in the wealth and positive symbols of the society.”  He summarizes the 
relationship of language and participation by saying that “Linguistic policy has the 
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potential to enlarge participation in power, wealth and prestige and to restrict it” and 
further argues that “…imposition of an unknown language can prevent people from 
participating in the most important activities in their own political system; it can reduce 
them to the passive objects of judicial and bureaucratic action without control over their 
material condition….Even if this prejudice never takes the form of discrimination, 
speakers of pariah tongues are not allowed to participate fully in the collective ownership 
of positively valued symbols” (Weinstein 1983, 14).  Fardon and Furniss (1994, 17) note 
further that “Sponsorship of language by the state…may be especially [crucial] when the 
state…is often the major player in employment and the distribution of wealth….”  Laitin 
(1977, 125) asserts that giving a foreign language official status can exacerbate 
urban/rural stratification.  His argument suggests another indirect way in which language 
policy can affect participation. 
 
Language Policy, Protest and Rebellion 
Gurr (1993, 126) claims that disadvantage, cultural differences and conflict all 
contribute to the formation and strength of group identity and vice versa.  It follows then, 
that a group’s attachment to a particular language might be strengthened by restriction of 
its use or by restriction of access by means of language policy. Gurr (1993, 293) argues 
that access and/or autonomy are the most common major goals for communal groups 
whose issues involve cultural rights. 
  Weinstein (1983, 121) records several sources of language-based conflict.  Three 




“[1.] The masses are ‘mobilized’ in that they are ready for new experiences in a 
world that they perceive as changing because they have moved to urban 
areas or because they became literate; but lacking the proper language 
skills, their aspirations are blocked…. 
[2.] Attacks on language or denigration of language as a symbol threatens [sic] 
to deprive people of participation in respected values…. 
[3.] Powerful groups endeavor to enforce conformity to their language, and 
resistance culminates in struggle and war.” 
Here we have them:  access, symbolism and, following those, resistance.  
Language, then, is important not only in itself but as a symbol of other valued 
characteristics and as a means of access to socioeconomic benefits, individual justice and 
political participation.  There appear to be at least three possible reasons why language 
conflict could produce or contribute to protest and rebellion.  Although language is 
frequently an emotional issue, that characteristic does not preclude rational action.  
Fishman (1997, 161) points out that “Cultures per se (and cultural identities and 
mobilizations in defense of such identities) are not rational blueprints….but nevertheless, 
the goals they pursue may be approached via rational thought and via rational means.”  
Edwards (1985, 92) uses this logic when he attributes voluntary assimilation into a 
language majority to “pragmatic desires for social mobility and an improved standard of 
living.”  If a linguistic minority behaves as a rational actor when choosing to merge with 
the majority, why should a different linguistic minority not be considered a rational actor 
when it chooses protest or rebellion instead?  Pool (1990) discusses extensively the utility 
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of a choice of a particular language for purposes of communication; the same process can 
be applied to the choice of participating or not participating in protest or rebellion over 
language issues. 
Discussing the importance of language in its own right, Weinstein (1983, 134) 
asserts that “Attacks on the dignity and status of a language are more than attacks on the 
economic and political aspirations of those who use them.  They are attacks on the self-
esteem of peoples.”  In relation to language as a symbol, Brass (1991, 303) argues that 
mobilization around symbols and emotionally charged values is a major political and 
religious resource in a conflict with the controlling group(s).  He also attributes (Brass 
1991, 305) the highest potential for protest and rebellion to the access part of the 
equation:  “It is when competition for scarce resources such as jobs or housing is linked 
to these different policies and when blame for scarcities can be attached to centralizers or 
decentralizers that linguistic nationalism is most likely to appear.”  Bretton (1976, 444) 
links language-based protest and rebellion to public perception of language policy and the 
resulting “[f]ear of being barred from access to sources of wealth, or from employment, 
fear of having one’s children barred from the more prestigious – hence more rewarding – 
sources of income….”  Laitin (1977, 11) continues this thought with his statement that 
“…it is jobs which give languages status….” 
Williams (1984, 215), in his study of contributing factors to separatism, 
concludes: 
“…[L]inguistic concerns are often central to ethnic political activity, 
especially separatism.  Language is a means of mediating between the past 
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and the present; it is the repository of a group’s collective identity, rooted 
in a national territory.  Attempts to challenge this arrangement through 
state and private incursions often lead to reactive ethnic assertion…. 
[L]anguage promotion [is] not mere cultural attachment, but often a 
national and instrumental attempt to reduce socio-economic inequality, to 
wrest more power from the state and opposing groups, and to determine an 
increasing amount of the ethnic group’s role in the wider political 
structure.” 
Williams (1984, 184-5) also speaks of separatism as being “a reactive response to the 
erosion of a minority’s identity,” of which language is a key part. 
How does language get to be a political issue?  Weinstein (1983, 62) argues that it 
is by the influence of “[w]riters, translators, poets, missionaries, publishers, and 
dictionary makers” or, as he terms them, “cultural elites.”   Brass (1974, 45) contends that 
“…political organizations do not simply reflect or transmit communal demands…[but]… 
shape group consciousness by manipulating symbols of group identity to achieve power 
for their group.”  As discussed above, if language is a symbol of group identity, then it 
can and will be used by political organizations to promote group cohesiveness.  Another 
way in which language becomes a political issue is as a response to government language 
policy.  “…[C]entralizing policies which involve also central intervention in regional 
politics may precipitate strong regional reactions from language communities and 
demands for regional autonomy and even secession” (Brass 1991, 305-6). 
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Fierman’s (1990, 219) case study links language to legitimacy, both directly and 
indirectly through identity, distribution and participation.  He concludes that a central 
factor is a regime’s willingness to address the issue of participation as related to 
language.  Responsiveness to language issues by the creation of a language policy 
allowing for a certain level of participation by linguistic minorities would appear, then, to 
bolster a regime’s legitimacy and thus reduce the likelihood of language-based protest 
and rebellion.  In his study of democratic development, Dasgupta (1990, 237) concluded 
that language policy can contribute to social transformation by affirming the democratic 
rights of lower social levels.  The other side of the coin would be that language policy can 
aggravate stratification by restricting the political access of lower social levels.  Both 
situations are demonstrated by Laitin’s (1992, 15) analysis of four African countries. 
 While concentrating more on the use of language policy to produce a given 
outcome of language use within a country, Laitin (1992, 69) argues that the language 
outcome of a particular country is ultimately dependent upon the language choices of 
individuals.  By extension, the choice to retain and protect a particular native language 
can lead to protest and rebellion.  The challenge which remains is that of finding the link 
between the language policy of a country and the choice of a group composed of minority 













While there are many variables that have been found by previous researchers to 
be contributory factors to protest and rebellion, the present study concentrates on 
language policy.  This research is an exploratory analysis designed to determine whether 
in fact a relationship exists between language policy and protest or rebellion.  Once that 
question has been answered, future research in this area will need to take into account 
variables that have been shown to have a strong relationship with protest and/or rebellion. 
Given that differential treatment of minority groups by a government has been 
shown to have an effect on protest and rebellion, and given that language has proved to 
be a highly emotional issue, four hypotheses are presented for study: 
(1) Minority groups whose languages have a more restricted status under their 
country’s language policy will demonstrate higher protest and rebellion 
scores; conversely, those with a more protected language status with 
demonstrate lower protest and rebellion scores. 
(2) Countries with more restrictive language policies will have higher protest 
and rebellion scores, and vice versa. 
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(3) Groups whose language status varies negatively from their country’s 
standard policy toward minority languages will have higher protest and 
rebellion scores, and vice versa. 
(4) Countries whose language policies have a higher internal variation in their 
language provisions will be associated with higher protest and rebellion 
scores, and vice versa. 
 
Definitions 
The independent variable for the present study is language policy as set forth in 
the constitution of a country (“constitutional language policy”).  This is one component 
of overt language policy, others being international treaties; federal laws; state or 
provincial constitutions; state, regional or provincial laws and local laws.  Analyzing 
constitutional language policy takes advantage of cross-national data already compiled by 
Fernand de Varennes (1998).  It also provides a basis for future research on the influence 
of international treaties, for which data are available from the same source, and on the 
effect of the other types of laws listed above.  Although constitutional provisions are not 
necessarily carried out in practice, the study of a wide range of countries should provide a 
balanced set of data including countries whose practices are more restrictive with respect 
to language groups than their constitutional policies indicate and countries whose 
practices are more promotive than demonstrated by constitutional provisions. 
The full scope of political action is outlined by Weiner’s (1971, 164) definition of 
political participation as “any voluntary action…intended to influence the choice of 
public policies, the administration of public affairs, or the choice of political 
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leaders…participation is defined as action, including verbal action….”  Political action 
specific to this research are protest and rebellion by politicized minority groups as coded 
in the Minorities at Risk Project (University of Maryland 1999; Gurr 1993).  In order to 
be included in the Minorities at Risk study, a group must meet two criteria: it 
“collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other 
groups in a society” and/or “is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in 
defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.” (University of Maryland 1999, 
groups.html) 
 
Measuring Language Policy 
 Can language policy be measured?  A meaningful measurement must involve the 
classification of language policy in some manner relevant to known determinants of 
protest and rebellion.  Previous research has linked language issues to transfer of cultural 
identity from one generation to another, access to better employment and access to 
judicial and administrative systems. Language policy measurement, then, should be 
conducted from the angles which best fit those particular functions of language. 
Education and administration are the most often mentioned.  Both Edwards (1985, 
118-19) and Fishman (1997) observe that although education in a mother tongue does not 
necessarily contribute to the preservation of that particular language and may in fact 
contribute rather to the process of linguistic assimilation, education is often perceived as 
a central factor in maintaining group identity and therefore has a strong symbolic role for 
linguistic minorities. Bretton (1976, 445) and Chaklader (1990, 94) link choice of 
language for education to choice of language for courts.  Varennes (1998, 158) perceives 
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“great potential for destabilisation” in the denial of native-language education.  Some 
language policies cover broadcast and publishing media.  Others include  special 
language requirements for government employment or certain professions. 
Three constitutional language policy areas are examined as separate country 
variables: administrative/ judicial, education, and general.  Status of minority group 
languages under these policies is measured by corresponding group variables.  Part of the 
purpose of the present research is to establish a language policy data set that can be 
supplemented with data analyzed in future studies.  Language policy is coded by means 
of scales for each variable ranging from +4 to –4 in value, with the positive side of the 
scale representing the protective or promotive character of a policy toward minority 
languages, the negative side representing the policy’s restrictiveness and a value of 0 
representing the absence of a constitutional policy. 
 Brass (1974, 10-11) distinguishes between integrative and pluralistic policies, the 
former involving assimilation of minorities into a common cultural identity and the latter 
reflecting recognition of the various cultural groups within a state.   Weinstein (1983, 83) 
describes four ways in which language policy can negatively affect linguistic minorities:  
(1) denial of the opportunity to learn their mother tongue, the country’s official language 
or a world language; (2) exclusion of a particular language group from participation; 
(3) requirement of arbitrarily chosen languages for employment or licensing and (4) use 
of largely unknown languages for community and governmental affairs.  Kloss (1968, 79) 
suggests a set of typologies including a juridical typology.  He classifies juridical status 
as (1) sole official language, (2) coequal official language, (3) regional or provincial 
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official language, (3) de facto promotion or support by various levels of government, 
(4) neither promoted nor restricted and (5) forbidden.  Not surprisingly, a preliminary 
review of the constitutional language provisions in the selected data source indicates that 
there are at least three levels of endorsed languages:  (1) “official;” (2) “native,” 
“indigenous,” “vernacular” or some similar term and (3) “link” or “communication” 
languages. 
Drawing conclusions as to what level of tolerance or protection of minority 
languages is desirable or feasible while conducting government business in a practical 
manner would be outside the scope of this study, but language policy can be ranked fairly 
objectively by the extent to which it restricts or promotes minority language use and the 
extent to which it restricts access to society’s benefits through the use of native language 
requirements.  Varennes’ (1996) discussion of language rights provides a substantial  
basis for several of the assumptions behind the ranking in the language policy scales.  A 
review of the policies provides further details.  As part of the process of developing the 
scales, several language policies which appeared simple and several policies which 
appeared complex were coded for country and group variables and the scales were 
adapted as appropriate. 
The most severe restriction of language use is the proscription of even private 
usage of a particular language.  Such severity is rare in constitutional policy but is 
sometimes enacted as law (e.g. Varennes 1996, 49, 164), thus exemplifying one direction 
for future research.  However, a constitution may provide specifically that languages may 
be banned by law. Varennes (1996, 15) also cites several instances where the teaching or 
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classroom use of certain languages has been forbidden by law.  Language prohibitions 
have been placed at the lower end of each language policy scale, allowing easy future 
comparison with laws at or below the national level. At the other end of the spectrum are 
language rights guarantees, which again are not all that common.  Coding this level of 
protection as the highest score not only accounts for the most extreme level of language 
protection found in the present research but also provides for convenient later comparison 
with international law and treaties, where such provisions are more often found. 
It is crucial to distinguish between government requirements regarding the use of 
an official language and government restrictions on the use of a minority language.  The 
two are not the same; the latter are scaled at a lower level because they represent a more 
severe restriction of personal freedom and of access to the benefits of society.  Varennes 
(1996, 44, 159) discusses the distinction between public and private use of language, with 
provision of government services falling in the public area and private matters including 
printed media, entertainment and private organizational activities.  Each language policy 
scale has been constructed with this distinction in mind. Policies concerning private 
activities have by nature a more personal impact than those regarding public matters, and 
would appear more likely to generate resistance. Sometimes the distinction is a little 
fuzzy.  For example, public and private spheres overlap in the choice of personal names.  
Names are private, yet the recording of names in the form of birth records is a public 
matter.  Some governments have placed language restrictions on personal names 
(Varennes 1996: 159-62).  Place names are not as personal but demonstrate another area 
in which governments may move beyond language requirements for public areas and 
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prohibit the use of non-official languages for place names used by private individuals or 
organizations. 
Varennes (1996, 174) refers to the provision of a court interpreter as being 
included in “generally recognized human rights.”  This type of provision is coded at a 
minimum level on the positive side of the scale.  As the right is more often provided in 
criminal proceedings, the right to have an interpreter or use a native language in civil 
and/or administrative proceedings are assigned a higher value. 
The Language Policy Country Data Form and the Group Language Status Data 
Form (Appendix A) were used to code language policy from the constitutional excerpts 
in Varennes’ (1998) compilation.  Each form is divided into a general information section 
and a section for each language policy variable.  Language policy of each country, and 
then the effect of that language policy on each politicized minority group in that country, 
are ranked on each of the three language policy variables.  The group scale is slightly 
different from the country scale in order to allow ranking for the level of recognition of 
each minority language.  This procedure allows for the frequent cases where one minority 
language holds a different status from another.  Once language policy and language status 
variables were coded, additional variables were calculated based on the difference 
between each group’s language status score and the country language policy score 
(“group differential”) and on the difference between the highest and lowest group 
language policy scores within a country  (“country differential”). 




Score Provision for Minority Languages   
4 Promotive 
3 Very protective 
2 Somewhat protective 
1 Minimally protective 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Minimally restrictive 
-2 Somewhat restrictive 
-3 Very restrictive 
-4 Punitive 
 
Each variable was coded using the following specific guidelines: 
Language Policy for Administrative/Judicial Matters 
Score Description          
4 Allows use of native language for all court proceedings 
3 Provides for use of native language in local areas where language is prevalent  
and/or provides for interpretation in both civil and criminal cases 
2 Allows use of native language for federal agency proceedings 
1 Provides for interpretation of charges and trial in criminal cases 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Permits use of native language in court by foreigners only 
-2 Limits legislative positions to native speakers of official language 
-3 Limits voting rights to native speakers of official language 
-4 Forbids use of specific language(s) or of language(s) prohibited by law 
 
Language Policy for Educational Matters 
Score Description          
4 Provides for teaching of native language at all levels or as an open-ended right 
3 Provides for teaching of native language through secondary level or for teaching 
of any language in public and private education 
2 Provides for teaching of native language through primary level or as a general 
right subject to national interest 
1 Allows teaching of native language on temporary basis only or protects rights 
under existing law or custom 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Allows teaching of native language to immigrants only 
-2 Limits education to official language(s) 
-3 Teaching of specific language(s) is forbidden 




Language Policy for General Matters 
Score Description          
4 Requires minimum amount of publication/broadcast in minority languages, 
declares all languages and alphabets equal and/or requires labor and private 
organizations to protect language rights 
3 Requires federal/local laws to protect language rights or designates multiple 
official and/or national languages 
2 Provides for regional languages and/or prescribes use of native language for 
local community events and/or personal names 
1 Prohibits civil rights, human rights or employment discrimination 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Requires use of official language for place names 
-2 Requires use of official language in workplace and/or limits entrance to certain 
professions to native speakers of official language 
-3 Forbids use of specific language(s) or of language(s) prohibited by law in public 
areas or in print, recording or broadcast media and/or requires use of official 
language for personal names 
-4 Forbids use of specific language(s) or of language(s) prohibited by law in private 
areas 
 
Each group’s language status under its country’s constitutional policy is coded as: 
Score Group Language Status    
4 Official 
3 Highly favored 
2 Somewhat favored 
1 Allowed 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Minimally restricted 
-2 Somewhat restricted 
-3 Highly restricted 
-4 Forbidden 
Detail for each category is as follows: 
Group Language Status Regarding Administrative/Judicial Matters 
Score Description          
4 Either (a) group’s language is official language for all court proceedings 
or (b)use of native language is allowed for all court proceedings 
3 Either (a) policy provides for use of native language if prevalent in local area 
or (b) interpretation is required in both civil and criminal cases 
2 Use of native language is allowed for federal agency proceedings 
1 Interpretation of charges and trial in criminal cases is required 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
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Group Language Status Regarding Administrative/Judicial Matters 
Score Description          
-1 Use of native language in court is allowed for foreigners only 
-2 Legislative positions are limited to native speakers of official language, and 
group’s language is not official language 
-3 Voting rights are limited to native speakers of official language, and group’s 
language is not official language 
-4 Use of group’s language(s) is forbidden 
 
Group Language Status Regarding Educational Matters 
Score Description          
4 Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language at all levels or as an 
open-ended right, 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at all levels 
3 Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language through secondary 
level or for teaching of any language in public and private education 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at secondary level 
2 Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language through primary level 
or as a general right subject to national interest 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at secondary level 
1 Teaching of native language is allowed on temporary basis only, or rights are 
protected under existing law or custom, and group’s language is not official 
language for education at any level 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
-1 Native language teaching is allowed for immigrants only 
-2 Education is given only in official language(s), and group’s language is not 
official language 
-3 Teaching of group’s language(s) is forbidden 
-4 Use of group’s language(s) is forbidden 
 
Group Language Status Regarding General Matters 
Score Description          
4 Either (a) group’s language is official language 
or (b) policy requires minimum amount of publication/broadcast in minority 
languages, declares all languages and alphabets equal and/or requires labor and 
private organizations to protect language rights 
3 Either (a) federal/local laws are required to protect language rights 
or (b) group is one of multiple official and/or national languages 
2 Either (a) policy prescribes use of native language for local community events 
and/or personal names 
or (b) group’s language is designated as a regional language 
1 Civil rights, human rights or employment discrimination is prohibited 
0 No provision / To be determined by law 
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Group Language Status Regarding General Matters 
Score Description          
-1 Official language is required for place names, and group’s language is not 
official language 
-2 Official language is required in workplace and/or entrance to certain professions 
is limited to native speakers of official language, and group’s language is not 
official language 
-3 Either (a) Use of group’s language(s) is prohibited by law in public areas or in 
print, recording or broadcast media, 
or (b) use of official language is required for personal names and group’s 
language is not official language 
-4 Use of group’s language(s) is prohibited by law in private areas 
 
It is important here to give careful consideration to exactly what facets of 
language policy are being measured and what can be learned from them.  The variations 
in language policy under study are the difference between one country’s language policy 
and another and the difference between the impact of a particular country’s language 
policy on one group from the impact of that policy on another group in the same country. 
 
Measuring Protest and Rebellion 
The dependent variables studied are the protest and rebellion measures from the 
Minorities at Risk study (University of Maryland 1999; Gurr 1993).  Both variables 
reflect the highest level of political action in that particular category by members of a 
politically mobilized group “on behalf of the group’s interests and directed against those 
who claim to exercise authority over the group” (University of Maryland 1999).  Protest 
and rebellion accounts were compiled by Minorities at Risk researchers from news items 





Score Description          
0 none reported 
1 verbal opposition (public letters, petitions, posters, publications, agitation, etc.) 
2 scattered acts of symbolic resistance (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic), sabotage, 
symbolic destruction of property 
3 political organizing activity on a substantial scale 
4 a few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation less than 10,000 
5 demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation estimated between 10,000 
and 100,000 
6 demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, total participation over 100,000 
99 no basis for judging 
 
Rebellion 
Score Description          
0 none reported 
1 political banditry, sporadic terrorism 
2 campaigns of terrorism 
3 local rebellions: armed attempts to seize power in a locale. If they prove to be the 
opening round in what becomes a protracted guerrilla or civil war during the year being 
coded, code the latter rather than local rebellion 
4 small-scale guerrilla activity, which includes all these three traits: 
--fewer than 1000 armed fighters  
--sporadic armed attacks (less than 6 reported per year)  
--attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other 
locales) 
5 intermediate-scale guerrilla activity, which has one or two of the defining traits of large-
scale activity and one or two of the defining traits of small-scale activity 
6 large-scale guerrilla activity, which has all these traits: 
--more than 1000 armed fighters  
--frequent armed attacks (more than 6 reported per year)  
--attacks affecting a large part of the area occupied by the group 
7 protracted civil war, fought by rebel military units with base areas 
99 no basis for judging 
 (University of Maryland 1999) 
 
The groups involved are what Gurr (1993, 3) terms “communal groups…groups 
whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective identity based on cultural 
traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others with whom they interact.”  He names 
language as one of the several bases for identity.  Not only are they communal groups, 
but they are politicized communal groups – those who either “experience economic or 
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political discrimination” or “have taken political action in support of collective interests” 
or both (Gurr 1993, 5-6). 
Some important caveats must be considered in regard to the use of Minorities at 
Risk data.  First, multiple language groups are lumped together as needed to meet the 
minimum group size of 100,000 or 1% of the country’s population or if (in the opinion of 
the researchers) they are regarded and treated by the dominant majority as one group. 
This does not allow for convenient analysis of a language within the group which is of 
different status from other native languages within the group.  (Although the Minorities at 
Risk criterion was revised while the present study was in progress from a 1995 
population of 1 million to a 1998 population of 500,000, the original criterion was kept 
for purposes of this study.)  Second, refugees and recent immigrants are not included.  
There has been considerable study on language issues as they apply to immigrants (e.g. 
Edwards 1984b; Reitzes and Crawhall 1998); language issues such as education would 
also apply to refugees.  However, refugees and new immigrants are not citizens; they 
certainly have options in the area of political action, including protest and rebellion, but 
are apt to be restrained in their choices due to the fact that they are in a particular country 
on sufferance and are subject to deportation at the whim of the host government. 
 In spite of the reservations just outlined, I made the decision to use the Minorities 
at Risk data for two reasons.  First, the Minorities at Risk Project appears to be the only 
piece of large-scale cross-country research on political action that focuses on adversarial 
action (protest and rebellion) directed specifically toward the state by minority groups.  
This focus eliminates protest and rebellion unrelated to minority issues, which is 
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important because language is a minority issue, and eliminates intergroup conflict, which 
is a valid area for future research but is not the focus of the present study.  Second, data 
covering a large span of time periods are available and should continue to become 
available, producing the expectation that the Minorities at Risk data set is a stable source 
for future study.  The Minorities at Risk Project covers more recent time periods than 
other cross-country domestic conflict studies; certain of these overlap with the periods for 
which constitutional language policy data are available from the proposed source. 
 
Intervening Variables 
 Since language can be used as an identifying factor for racial or ethnic 
discrimination rather than language-specific discrimination, other cultural variables from 
the Minorities at Risk data set were analyzed.  The most obvious of these is the language 
difference variable, because the extent of a group’s language ties may help determine the 
level of protest or rebellion produced in connection with language policy.  Others are 
whether the group has different social customs from mainstream society, level of 
difference in religious belief and extent of racial difference.  These variables have been 
coded as follows: 
Difference in Language 
Score Description         
1 Group members speak a common language or dialect. 
2 Group members speak multiple languages or dialects. 
3 Group members have undergone significant linguistic assimilation. 





Difference in Customs 
Score Description         
0 No - Social customs are no different from mainstream society. 
1 Yes – Social customs are different. 
(University of Maryland 1999) 
 
Difference in Belief 
Score Description          
1 Group is a different sect within the same religion as the dominant group. 
2 Group includes multiple sects, some different from the dominant group. 
3 Group is of a different religion from the dominant group. 
(University of Maryland 1999) 
 
Difference in Race 
Score Description         
1 Group is of same racial stock as the dominant group but is a physically 
distinguishable subtype. 
2 Group is of different racial stock from the dominant group, with significant 
intermixture. 
3 Group is of different racial stock, with little or no intermixture. 
(University of Maryland 1999) 
 
Levels of Measurement 
Possible levels of measurement include group and country.  Language policy data 
are based on constitutional documents of each nation-state; protest and rebellion data are 
available on a group basis.  In order to take advantage of both levels of study, data were 
measured at both levels.  State language policy was coded both in general and as it relates 
to specific groups for which protest and rebellion data are available in the Minorities at 
Risk study.  Subsequently, the highest protest and rebellion measurements for the groups 
in a particular country were coded as country-based variables so that both cross-group 
and cross-country analyses could be performed.  As the groups in the Minorities at Risk 
study are broken down into categories, group analyses were conducted on each group 
type.  The link between country and group data which enables coding of group language 
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status is the native language of each group.  This factor was obtained as much as possible 
from the group summaries that form part of the background information for the 
Minorities at Risk project, and as needed from the Ethnologue database (SIL 1999), a 
linguistic reference source. 
 
Case Selection 
 As is frequently the rule, the variable definitions and data sources chosen define 
the boundaries of the possible cases for this study.  To allow for ten year-by-year 
comparisons of language policy, protest and rebellion, and to better prepare the 
groundwork for a future time series study, protest and rebellion variables which are 
available on an annual basis are used.  The first phase of the Minorities at Risk (“MAR”) 
Project involved five-year breakpoints, but the second phase, covering the years 1985 to 
1994, used annual data.  All countries are included which were in existence during all 
years chosen for analysis, meet the Minorities at Risk population criterion, have a formal 
constitution as part of their governmental system and had a stable language policy (or 
absence thereof) for the years 1984 to 1993.  The one-year lag between language policy 
and protest and rebellion data accounts for the fact that a constitution or a constitutional 
amendment could have taken effect at any time during the year and would not provide a 
meaningful same-year comparison. 
 
Statistical Model 
The country-level variables include the following variables for each year studied: 
Country language policy score for administration 
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Country language policy score for education 
Country language policy score for general matters 
Country protest score, equal to the highest group protest score within the 
country 
Country rebellion score, equal to the highest group rebellion score within 
the country 
Country language policy differential for administrative language policy, 
calculated as the difference between the highest and lowest group 
language status scores within the country 
Country language policy differential for educational language policy, 
calculated as above 
Country language policy differential for general language policy, 
calculated as above 
The group-level variables include the following annual scores: 
Group language status under language policy for administration 
Group language status under language policy for education 
Group language status under language policy for general matters 
Group differential for administrative language policy, calculated as the 
difference between group language status and the language status 
of minority groups in general under that particular language policy 
Group differential for education, calculated as above 
Group differential for other matters, calculated as above 
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Group protest score 
Group rebellion score 
and the following general variables: 
Difference in language as compared to dominant group 
Difference in social customs as compared to dominant group 
Difference in religion as compared to dominant group 
Difference in race as compared to dominant group 
The protest and rebellion data vary annually, while the language policy data are 
static for each country across the ten years studied.  The statistical component of this 
research consists of various sets, as outlined in the next chapter, of ten separate cross-
section analyses using linear regression – one for each of the years 1985-94 of the protest 
and rebellion data compared against years 1984-93 of the language policy data.  
Conducting multiple analyses should give some idea of whether the effect of language 
policy on protest and rebellion is stable over time when the language policy is the same. 
While groups are treated as independent cases, as one of the basic regression 
assumptions, it must be pointed out that groups within a country are connected by virtue 
of being subject to the same policy.  Coding group language status separately from group 
language policy addresses this to an extent by separating the effect of a country’s policy 
on one group from the effect of the same policy on another group, but there is no denying 
that all groups in a country may be similarly affected by the manner in which a country 










ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
 The statistical analysis involved seven stages:  (1) determining the language(s) 
applicable to each group, or the fact that the group speaks multiple languages; (2) coding 
language policy to produce the country language policy and group language status 
variables; (3) adapting the Minorities at Risk data set to include all language policy 
variables, protest and rebellion variables and tracking variables required for the present 
study; (4) selecting the relevant cases; (5) entering the values for the coded variables into 
the data set; (6) calculating the variables designed to be computed from the newly coded 
language policy variables or from the existing protest and rebellion variables and (7) 
running the regression analyses.  The order described may appear slightly irregular, in 
that the case selection was not the first step, but the sequence was chosen deliberately.  
Coding the language policy variables for all countries with final constitutional provisions 
listed by Varennes (1998) and determining the appropriate group languages at the 
beginning, rather than selecting cases first and coding only those countries, provides a 
base of constitutional language policy variables for future study.  Likewise, adding all 
language policy variables to the data set before creating a smaller data set with the 




Coding and Data Entry 
 The appropriate language for each group was determined by reviewing the group 
summaries provided as background to the Minorities at Risk data set.  Where language 
information was not included in these summaries, the Ethnologue data set (SIL 1999) was 
consulted.  Where neither source indicated a separate language, the group was assigned 
an official language that appeared appropriate from the background information in the 
group summaries.  For example, Blacks in Venezuela were assigned Spanish, as the 
group is defined as an ethnoclass and there is no indication of a language difference.  
Language policy as set forth in the final constitutional provisions (and not the draft 
provisions) compiled by Varennes (1998) was coded on a country basis; each group’s 
status under that policy was then coded.  As the exercise progressed, it became clear that 
a much more efficient design for future studies of this type would be to use a country 
coding list as a guideline and fill in a line on a spreadsheet form for each country's 
coding, and to use a similar procedure for group language status. 
 Language policy variables were added to the design of the Minorities at Risk data 
set for the ten years under study.  (The April 1999 version of the data set was used for the 
present study; at least one newer version was released while this study was in progress.)  
Variables added include constitutional language policy regarding administrative and 
judicial matters, educational matters and general matters; each group's status under 
constitutional language policy for each area listed above; group/country differential, to be 
calculated as the group language status less the constitutional language policy for the 
appropriate country; the range of group status within each country, to be computed as the 
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difference between the highest and lowest group language status variables for each area.  
Index variables to be calculated as the sum of the three specific variables were also added 
for each of the variable groups listed above.  Two sets of protest and rebellion variables 
were added:  country-level protest and country-level rebellion, to be represented by the 
highest level of protest and the highest level of rebellion among the groups in each 
country. 
 Case selection was implemented by (1) adding countries to the existing data set 
that met the population criteria for the Minorities at Risk study in the particular version of 
the data set used (1 million in 1995, as distinguished from the recently revised criterion of 
500,000 in 1998) but were not included in the Minorities at Risk study due to the absence 
of politicized minority groups and (2) choosing only those countries whose constitutions 
(a) became effective or were amended during or before the first year of the chosen ten-
year language provision period (1984-93) and (b) were not amended for language 
provisions during the remainder of that ten-year period.  Country identification numbers 
were assigned to the countries added, to conform the new entries to the existing countries 
in the data set.  Constitutional information for countries without language policy 
provisions (and therefore not listed in the primary data source) was obtained from the 
international constitutional law web site of the University of Wuerzburg (1999).  Names 
of countries not in either existing data source were found in The Statesman’s Yearbook 
1989-90 (Paxton 1989); the existence of a constitution was verified with the same source 
as needed.  Population statistics were obtained from the International Data Base of the 
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U.S. Census Bureau (1999).  The final data set contains 70 countries and 151 politicized 
group cases as listed in Appendix B. 
 
Review of Expectations 
 Based on the hypotheses stated in the previous chapter, the relationships expected 
from this study can be summarized as follows: 
1. a negative relationship between group language status on the one hand and 
protest and rebellion on the other; 
2. a negative relationship between country language policy score and protest 
and rebellion; 
3. a negative relationship between group language status differential and 
protest and rebellion; and 
4. a positive relationship between country language status differential and 
protest and rebellion. 
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
 As a test of the first hypothesis, namely that protest and rebellion are related 
negatively to favorable group language status, the first set of linear regressions measured 
the relationship of each group's status under the language policy variables for each year 
(1984-93) and the protest variable for each corresponding year (1985-94); group 
language status indices and protest; group language status variables and rebellion, and 
group language status indices and rebellion.  The results, summarized in Tables 1 and 2, 
indicate a positive relationship, rather than the expected negative relationship, between 
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group language status index and protest and between group language status and rebellion 
for most of the time periods analyzed.  If this positive relationship had been what was 
expected, the results would be significant, albeit with low beta values and r-squared 
measures. Based on these linear regression analyses, I must reject the first hypothesis. 
TABLE 1 Group Language Status and Group Protest – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Protest 1985 -.060 -.079 .543   .000 .388  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  .997 .131 .291     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  .060 .080 .631     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Protest 1985 .033 .117 .156  .007 .156  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Protest 1986 -.082 -.108 .405  -.001 .222  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  .113 .151 .223     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  .084 .112 .379     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Protest 1986 .038 .137 .096  .012 .096  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Protest 1987 -.038 -.500 .698  .010 .257  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  .117 .156 .207     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .043 .057 .652     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Protest 1987 .041 .145 .077  .014 .077  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Protest 1988 .086 .100 .446  .007 .568  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  .067 .078 .529     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  -.065 -.075 .557     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Protest 1988 .030 .092 .263  .002 .263  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Protest 1989 -.054 -.072 .578  .010 .217  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  .039 .053 .667     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .135 .182 .153     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Protest 1989 .040 .145 .077  .014 .077  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Protest 1990 .133 .148 .252  .016 .146  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  .024 .027 .827     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .026 .029 .821     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Protest 1990 .061 .183 .025  .027 .025  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Protest 1991 .009 .011 .935  .011 .203  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  .004 .048 .696     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .115 .132 .300     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Protest 1991 .055 .170 .038  .022 .038  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Protest 1992 -.155 -.179 .158  .063 .006  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  .223 .259 .032     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .151 .175 .158     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Protest 1992 .073 .226 .006  .045 .006  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Protest 1993 -.081 -.092 .471  .049 .017  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  .124 .143 .238     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .184 .210 .093     
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TABLE 1 Group Language Status and Group Protest – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Protest 1993 .076 .233 .004  .048 .004  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Protest 1994 -.087 -.106 .410  .027 .073  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  .187 .230 .061     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .059 .072 .569     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Protest 1994 .053 .173 .035  .023 .035  
Number of cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
TABLE 2 Group Language Status and Group Rebellion - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1985 .229 .194 .136  .009 .231  
Group Language Status 1984 – Educational  -.043 -.037 .763     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  -.033  .000 .998     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Rebellion 1985 .062 .141 .083  .013 .083  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1986 .222 .194 .135  .008 .240  
Group Language Status 1985 – Educational  -.044 -.039 .749     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  -.002 -.002 .987     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Rebellion 1986 .058 .138 .090  .013 .090  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1987 .160 .141 .275  .01 .221  
Group Language Status 1986 – Educational  -.038 -.034 .783     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .075 .067 .599     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Rebellion 1987 .066 .157 .054  .018 .054  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1988 .137 .123 .345  -.002 .438  
Group Language Status 1987 – Educational  -.070 -.064 .608     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  .072 .065 .611     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Rebellion 1988 .046 .112 .169  .006 .169  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1989 .123 .103 .428  .007 .256  
Group Language Status 1988 – Educational  -.058 -.049 .689     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .131 .111 .383     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Rebellion 1989 .065 .148 .070  .015 .070  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1990 .296 .238 .066  .026 .079  
Group Language Status 1989 – Educational  -.153 -.125 .309     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .078 .063 .617     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Rebellion 1990 .073 .160 .050  .019 .050  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1991 .205 .159 .218  .014 .170  
Group Language Status 1990 – Educational  -.131 -.104 .400     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .136 .106 .400     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Rebellion 1991 .070 .147 .072  .015 .072  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1992 .145 .123 .347  -.005 .529  
Group Language Status 1991 – Educational  -.107 -.092 .460     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .074 .063 .619     
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TABLE 2 Group Language Status and Group Rebellion - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Rebellion 1992 .037 .086 .294  .001 .294  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1993 .142 .124 .341  -.004 .495  
Group Language Status 1992 – Educational  -.076 -.067 .588     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .063 .055 .664     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Rebellion 1993 .043 .102 .213  .004 .213  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1994 .085 .074 .570  -.010 .669  
Group Language Status 1993 – Educational  -.075 -.066 .597     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .090 .079 .538     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Rebellion 1994 .034 .079 .335  .000 .335  
Number of cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
 The second hypothesis meets with a similar fate.  As summarized in Tables 3 
and 4, language policy indices demonstrate a positive relationship with protest, rather 
than the expected negative relationship, in all ten pairs of years studied.  The results also 
show a positive relationship between educational language policy and protest in nearly all 
instances, a positive relationship between general language policy and protest in half the 
periods studied and a positive relationship between general language policy and rebellion 
in just under half the periods.  Again, these would be statistically significant if the 
positive relationship had been hypothesized.  While the r-squared values for rebellion are 
extremely low, those for protest are slightly more robust.  On their face, these results call 
into question the hypothesis that egalitarian language policies at the constitutional level 





TABLE 3 Language Policy and Country Protest Score - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Language Policy 1984 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1985 -.126 -.102 .493  .081 .035  
Language Status 1984 – Educational  .253 .221 .128     
Language Status 1984 – General  .283 .266 .043     
Language Status 1984 – Index Country Protest 1985 .142 .295 .013  .074 .013  
Language Policy 1985 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1986 -.159 -.127 .391  .101 .018  
Language Status 1985 – Educational  .281 .241 .093     
Language Status 1985 – General  .315 .291 .026     
Language Status 1985 – Index Country Protest 1986 .151 .310 .009  .083 .009  
Language Policy 1986 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1987 -.113 -.094 .530  .080 .037  
Language Status 1986 – Educational  .303 .268 .065     
Language Status 1986 – General  .223 .213 .103     
Language Status 1986 – Index Country Protest 1987 .141 .300 .012  .077 .012  
Language Policy 1987 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1988 .093 .067 .655  .068 .054  
Language Status 1987 – Educational  .212 .163 .261     
Language Status 1987 – General  .221 .183 .162     
Language Status 1987 – Index Country Protest 1988 .177 .326 .006  .093 .006  
Language Policy 1988 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1989 .080 .062 .674  .106 .016  
Language Status 1988 – Educational  .293 .244 .089     
Language Status 1988 – General  .184 .165 .198     
Language Status 1988 – Index Country Protest 1989 .187 .372 .002  .126 .002  
Language Policy 1989 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1990 .058 .004 .979  .120 .009  
Language Status 1989 – Educational  .413 .294 .039     
Language Status 1989 – General  .237 .184 .154     
Language Status 1989 – Index Country Protest 1990 .222 .377 .001  .130 .001  
Language Policy 1990 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1991 -.053 -.036 .811  .054 .084  
Language Status 1990 – Educational  .341 .250 .090     
Language Status 1990 – General  .184 .145 .270     
Language Status 1990 – Index Country Protest 1991 .161 .281 .018  .065 .018  
Language Policy 1991 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1992 -.300 -.200 .178  .099 .019  
Language Status 1991 – Educational  .546 .391 .007     
Language Status 1991 – General  .191 .147 .253     
Language Status 1991 – Index Country Protest 1992 .152 .260 .030  .054 .030  
Language Policy 1992 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1993 -.223 -.146 .328  .088 .029  
Language Status 1992 – Educational  .486 .340 .020     
Language Status 1992 – General  .225 .170 .190     
Language Status 1982 – Index Country Protest 1993 .168 .282 .018  .066 .018  
Language Policy 1993 – Adm/Judicial Country Protest 1994 -.355 -.252 .079  .165 .002  
Language Status 1993 – Educational  .686 .523 .000     
Language Status 1993 – General  .094 .077 .533     
Language Status 1993 – Index Country Protest 1994 .148 .269 .024  .059 .024  




TABLE 4 Language Policy and Country Rebellion Score - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Language Policy 1984 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1985 
-.278 -.132 .399  -.008 .494  
Language Status 1984 – Educational  .083 .042 .779     
Language Status 1984 – General  .360 .198 .147     
Language Status 1984 – Index Country Rebellion 
1985 
.062 .076 .532  -.009 .532  
Language Policy 1985 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1986 
-.296 -.145 .353  -.001 .409  
Language Status 1985 – Educational  .073 .038 .800     
Language Status 1985 – General  .387 .218 .109     
Language Status 1985 – Index Country Rebellion 
1986 
.062 .078 .523  -.009 .523  
Language Policy 1986 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1987 
-.359 -.175 .258  .013 .283  
Language Status 1986 – Educational  .082 .043 .773     
Language Status 1986 – General  .438 .248 .067     
Language Status 1986 – Index Country Rebellion 
1987 
.063 .079 .516  -.008 .516  
Language Policy 1987 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1988 
-.353 -.175 .262  -.004 .440  
Language Status 1987 – Educational  .075 .040 .791     
Language Status 1987 – General  .348 .200 .142     
Language Status 1987 – Index Country Rebellion 
1988 
.031 .040 .745  -.013 .745  
Language Policy 1988 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1989 
-.336 -.162 .304  -.022 .676  
Language Status 1988 – Educational  .121 .063 .680     
Language Status 1988 – General  .230 .128 .348     
Language Status 1988 – Index Country Rebellion 
1989 
.012 .015 .905  -.014 .905  
Language Policy 1989 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1990 
-.174 -.078 .621  -.020 .647  
Language Status 1989 – Educational  .011 .005 .973     
Language Status 1989 – General  .335 .173 .207     
Language Status 1989 – Index Country Rebellion 
1990 
.063 .072 .554  -.009 .554  
Language Policy 1990 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1991 
-.303 -.133 .398  -.017 .604  
Language Status 1990 – Educational  .085 .040 .791     
Language Status 1990 – General  .336 .170 .214     
Language Status 1990 – Index Country Rebellion 
1991 
.047 .052 .666  -.012 .666  
Language Policy 1991 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1992 
-.299 -.143 .364  -.018 .628  
Language Status 1991 – Educational  .129 .066 .663     
Language Status 1991 – General  .280 .154 .259     
Language Status 1991 – Index Country Rebellion 
1992 
.043 .053 .665  -.012 .665  
Language Policy 1992 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1993 
-.157 -.075 .636  -.026 .740  
Language Status 1992 – Educational  .108 .055 .717     
Language Status 1992 – General  .246 .135 .324     
Language Status 1992 – Index Country Rebellion 
1993 
.070 .086 .481  -.007 .481  
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TABLE 4 Language Policy and Country Rebellion Score - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Language Policy 1993 – Adm/Judicial Country Rebellion 
1994 
-.236 -.108 .493  -.030 .798  
Language Status 1993 – Educational  .119 .059 .699     
Language Status 1993 – General  .217 .115 .401     
Language Status 1993 – Index Country Rebellion 
1994 
.039 .046 .708  -.013 .708  
Number of cases = 70 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
 The analyses of group differential variables summarized in Tables 5 and 6 reflect 
no significant relationship between administrative/judicial group differential and protest 
but a positive relationship between administrative/judicial group differential and rebellion 
for over half the periods. The three-variable model shows a positive relationship 
involving the rebellion variables in all of the years studied.  Considering the small 
R-squared values, a group with a language status above the norm for minority languages 
would appear to have a slightly higher likelihood of being involved in rebellion. 
Once again, the relationship is in a direction contrary to expectations and signals the
failure to confirm the third hypothesis.  One must ask, what happened to the importance 
of language? 
 
TABLE 5 Group Language Status Differential and Group Protest - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1985 .165 .198 .286  -.004 .501  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Educational 
 -.011 -.012 .952     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – General 
 -.134 -.158 .235     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Index 
Protest 1985 .096 .032 .701  -.006 .701  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1986 .079 .094 .611  -.011 .693  
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TABLE 5 Group Language Status Differential and Group Protest - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Educational 
 .063 .072 .724     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – General 
 -.098 -.114 .412     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Index 
Protest 1986 .016 .052 .531  -.004 .531  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1987 .115 .137 .462  -.009 .654  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Educational 
 -.066 -.008 .970     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – General 
 -.032 -.037 .788     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Index 
Protest 1987 .027 .088 .286  .001 .286  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1988 .050 .052 .781  -.019 .982  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Educational 
 -.050 -.005 .980     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – General 
 -.047 -.047 .734     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Index 
Protest 1988 .000 .001 .988  -.007 .988  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1989 -.034 -.041 .825  -.013 .728  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Educational 
 -.001 -.001 .996     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – General 
 .095 .112 .418     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Index 
Protest 1989 .019 .064 .436  -.003 .436  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1990 .151 .152 .415  -.014 .811  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Educational 
 -.096 -.092 .651     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – General 
 .000 .000 .998     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Index 
Protest 1990 .020 .055 .504  -.004 .504  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1991 .101 .104 .576  -.007 .587  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Educational 
 -.089 -.088 .665     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – General 
 .096 .097 .483     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Index 
Protest 1991 .036 .102 .217  .004 .217  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1992 .068 .071 .701  .004 .308  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Educational 
 -.038 -.038 .849     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – General 
 .128 .130 .345     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Index 
Protest 1992 .052 .148 .071  .015 .071  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1993 .142 .145 .432  .000 .405  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Educational 
 -.147 -.144 .476     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – General 
 .139 .130 .347     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Index 
Protest 1993 .041 .117 .156  .007 .156  
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TABLE 5 Group Language Status Differential and Group Protest - Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Adm/Judicial 
Protest 1994 .160 .175 .343  .006 .273  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Educational 
 -.264 -.278 .170     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – General 
 .192 .206 .134     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Index 
Protest 1994 .029 .087 .294  .001 .294  
Number of cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
TABLE 6 Group Language Status Differential and Group Rebellion – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1985 -.370 .282 .124  .013 .176  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Educational 
 -.051 -.037 .851     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – General 
 -.159 -.119 .383     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1984 – Index 
Rebellion 1985 .058 .122 .135  .008 .135  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1986 .371 .293 .110  .015 .162  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Educational 
 -.042 -.032 .874     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – General 
 -.195 -.151 .269     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1985 – Index 
Rebellion 1986 .050 .108 .189  .005 .189  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1987 .375 .299 .102  .018 .128  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Educational 
 -.034 -.026 .895     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – General 
 -.188 -.147 .282     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1986 – Index 
Rebellion 1987 .056 .124 .136  .009 .131  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1988 .340 .274 .605  .002 .348  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Educational 
 -.135 -.104 .575     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – General 
 -.097 -.077 .540     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1987 – Index 
Rebellion 1988 .040 .089 .275  .001 .275  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1989 .526 .397 .030  .025 .081  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Educational 
 -.260 -.188 .344     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – General 
 -.088 -.065 .630     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1988 – Index 
Rebellion 1989 .065 .135 .099  .012 .099  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1990 .730 .528 .004  .052 .013  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Educational 
 -.376 -.260 .185     
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TABLE 6 Group Language Status Differential and Group Rebellion – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – General 
 -.160 -.113 .398     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1989 – Index 
Rebellion 1990 .073 .146 .074  .015 .074  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1991 .721 .505 .006  .041 .028  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Educational 
 -.389 -.261 .186     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – General 
 -.187 -.128 .340     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1990 – Index 
Rebellion 1991 .057 .109 .182  .005 .182  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1992 .646 .494 .007  .034 .044  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Educational 
 -.418 -.306 .123     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – General 
 -.227 -.170 .210     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1991 – Index 
Rebellion 1992 .009 .018 .822  -.006 .822  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1993 .622 .489 .008  .032 .050  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Educational 
 -.390 -.294 .138     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – General 
 -.202 -.156 .250     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1992 – Index 
Rebellion 1993 .017 .038 .646  -.005 .646  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Adm/Judicial 
Rebellion 1994 .561 .440 .017  .022 .102  
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Educational 
 -.354 -.265 .184     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – General 
 -.150 -.115 .396     
Difference of Group Language Status from 
Standard Policy 1993 – Index 
Rebellion 1994 .026 .056 .497  -.004 .497  
Number of cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
 Results for the fourth hypothesis are mixed, as seen in Tables 7 and 8.  These 
linear regression analyses involved country differentials (the differences between the 
highest and lowest group language status scores within each country) as the independent 
variables.  The dependent variables are the country-level protest and rebellion variables, 
representing the highest group protest and group rebellion values within each country.  
Eight out of ten time periods show the expected positive relationship at significant levels 
between country differential and country protest for the administrative/judicial area of 
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language policy.  All ten periods show the same positive relationship for the language 
policy indices.  In the three-variable model, this relationship is significant in all ten 
periods.  The individual differential variables for educational and general language policy 
do not show a significant relationship with protest.  None of the country differentials 
show the expected positive relationship with country-level rebellion.  The protest figures 
finally yield an expected relationship, but, as further discussed in the next chapter, the 
greater incidence of protest found in countries with a wider variation in group language 
status levels cannot be used to support a conclusion that the groups with lower language 
status are those initiating the protest.  Such a conclusion would conflict with the other 
findings in this study. 
 
TABLE 7 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Protest – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1985 .496 .506 .011 ** .259 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – 
Educational 
 .035 .028 .903     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – General 
 .014 .014 .948     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – Index 
Country Protest 1985 .194 .511 .000 *** .251 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1986 .589 .591 .003 *** .251 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – 
Educational 
 -.036 -.029 .899     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – General 
 -.048 -.046 .826     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – Index 
Country Protest 1986 .186 .481 .000 *** .220 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1987 .480 .499 .016 ** .192 .001 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – 
Educational 
 -.117 -.099 .680     
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TABLE 7 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Protest – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – General 
 .075 .074 .734     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – Index 
Country Protest 1987 .164 .441 .000 *** .183 .003 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1988 .363 .327 .118  .150 .003 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – 
Educational 
 .087 .064 .796     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – General 
 .070 .060 .788     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – Index 
Country Protest 1988 .181 .422 .000 *** .166 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1989 .305 .296 .152  .167 .002 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – 
Educational 
 -.148 -.117 .630     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – General 
 .314 .288 .193     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – Index 
Country Protest 1989 .173 .436 .000 *** .178 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1990 .525 .437 .046 ** .083 .034 ** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – 
Educational 
 -.176 -.119 .640     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – General 
 .010 .008 .973     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – Index 
Country Protest 1990 .140 .302 .011 ** .076 .013 ** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1991 .474 .407 .048 ** .187 .001 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – 
Educational 
 .237 .165 .493     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – General 
 -.123 -.100 .646     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – Index 
Country Protest 1991 .200 .443 .000 *** .184 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1992 .561 .470 .024 ** .173 .001 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – 
Educational 
 .040 .027 .911     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – General 
 -059 -046 .833     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – Index 
Country Protest 1992 .194 .421 .000 *** .165 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1993 .445 .365 .080 * .160 .002 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – 
Educational 
 -.270 -.180 .463     
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TABLE 7 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Protest – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – General 
 .342 .264 .234     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – Index 
Country Protest 1993 .197 .418 .000 *** .163 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1994 .592 .529 .008 *** .249 .000 *** 
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – 
Educational 
 -.307 -.223 .336     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – General 
 .262 .221 .292     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – Index 
Country Protest 1994 .185 .410 .000 *** .156 .000 *** 
Number of cases = 70 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 
TABLE 8 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Rebellion – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.284 .170 .447  .020 .230  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – 
Educational 
 .666 .324 .223     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – General 
 -.863 -.486 .045     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1985 
.006 .010 .937  -.015 .937  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.252 .154 .492  .002 .374  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – 
Educational 
 .462 .231 .388     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – General 
 -.730 -.423 .082     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1986 
-.021 -.033 .784  -.014 .784  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.278 .171 .443  .024 .204  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – 
Educational 
 .666 .333 .209     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – General 
 -.871 -.505 .037     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1987 
-.001 -.002 .989  -.015 .989  
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TABLE 8 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Rebellion – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.282 .176 .433  .011 .296  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – 
Educational 
 .505 .256 .336     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – General 
 -.778 -.458 .059     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1988 
-.014 -.022 .855  -.014 .855  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.315 .191 .397  .003 .369  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – 
Educational 
 .436 .215 .421     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – General 
 -.729 -.416 .087     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1989 
-.005 -.008 .945  -.015 .945  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.025 .014 .951  -.023 .700  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – 
Educational 
 .584 .266 .325     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – General 
 -.499 -.264 .280     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1990 
.012 .008 .884  -.014 .884  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.297 .164 .471  -.014 .560  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – 
Educational 
 .361 .161 .548     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – General 
 -.648 -.336 .169     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1991 
-.006 -.009 .942  -.015 .942  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.189 .113 .620  -.027 .759  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – 
Educational 
 .325 .158 .559     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – General 
 -.418 -.236 .336     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1992 
.022 .035 .775  -.013 .775  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.224 .134 .559  -.035 .875  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – 
Educational 
 .088 .004 .987     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – General 
 -.294 -.166 .499     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1993 
-.017 -.026 .830  -.014 .830  
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TABLE 8 Country Language Policy Differential and Country Rebellion – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 




.263 .151 .508  -.028 .773  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – 
Educational 
 .105 .049 .856     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – General 
 -.425 -.231 .346     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1994 
-.029 -.042 .731  -.013 .731  
Number of cases = 70 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01 
 To further analyze the unexpected relationships seen in the majority of the results 
discussed above, a set of analyses comparable to the first was performed omitting 
minority groups whose language is official (not merely a national or similarly designated 
language) for all three policy areas or whose country policy declares all languages equal.  
Minority groups whose native language is the official language of their country would 
not be expected to engage in protest or rebellion over language issues.  For this reason, it 
does not seem logical that such groups would exhibit the highest degree of positive 
relationship between language policy or status and protest or rebellion.  As a practical 
matter this new set of analyses involved leaving out all group cases with a language 
policy index value of 12.  The results, summarized in Tables 9 and 10, reveal a stronger 
positive relationship between the index and protest or rebellion in most cases than was 
demonstrated in the analyses of all groups.  This appears to indicate that while groups 
with higher language status engage in more protest and rebellion, the most active groups 
are not the groups at the top of the language status hierarchy. These results indicate a 
possible convex curvilinear relationship between language policy or group language 
status and protest or rebellion, which is explored later in this section. 
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TABLE 9  Group Language Status (not including official language groups) and Group Protest 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Protest 1985 .003 -.003 .979  .011 .234  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  .123 .132 .206     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  .090 .094 .371     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Protest 1985 .074 .175 .054  .023 .054  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Protest 1986 -.042 -.039 .709  .038 .215  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  .131 .139 .180     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  .106 .109 .299     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Protest 1986 .072 .170 .063  .021 .063  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Protest 1987 -.027 -.016 .802  -.001 .417  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  .122 .136 .194     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .049 .053 .615     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Protest 1987 .054 .133 .146  .009 .146  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Protest 1988 .153 .125 .233  .004 .333  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  .096 .090 .387     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  -.030 -.027 .795     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Protest 1988 .074 .153 .094  .015 .094  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Protest 1989 -.011 -.011 .915  .015 .191  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  .058 .064 .535     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .157 .169 .107     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Protest 1989 .061 .150 .099  .014 .099  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Protest 1990 .266 .219 .031  .074 .007  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  .083 .078 .438     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .096 .088 .388     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Protest 1990 .138 .287 .001  .074 .001  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Protest 1991 .080 .068 .514  .025 .113  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  .073 .070 .495     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .152 .142 .174     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Protest 1991 .100 .212 .019  .037 .019  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Protest 1992 -.081 -.069 .491  .088 .003  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  .256 .249 .014     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .191 .179 .076     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Protest 1992 .128 .275 .002  .068 .002  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Protest 1993 -.015 -.013 .000  .061 .016  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  .153 .148 .145     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .218 .204 .047     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Protest 1993 .105 .225 .013  .043 .013  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Protest 1994 .004 .003 .975  .060 .017  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  .228 .228 .025     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .107 .104 .310     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Protest 1994 .096 .212 .020  .037 .020  




TABLE 10  Group Language Status (not incl. official language groups) and Group Rebellion 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1985 .284 .183 .079  .011 .236  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  -.019 -.014 .893     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  .029 .021 .843     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Rebellion 1985 .088 .144 .112  .013 .112  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1986 .286 .189 .070  .014 .203  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  -.016 -.012 .906     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  .032 .023 .825     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Rebellion 1986 .101 .168 .064  .020 .064  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1987 .222 .148 .154  .012 .216  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  -.011 -.008 .937     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .108 .079 .446     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Rebellion 1987 .109 .184 .041  .026 .041  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1988 .206 .139 .183  .006 .285  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  -.040 -.031 .768     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  .108 .080 .442     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Rebellion 1988 .095 .161 .076  .018 .076  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1989 .200 .128 .216  .017 .170  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  -.024 -.018 .864     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .172 .122 .241     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Rebellion 1989 .122 .197 .029  .031 .029  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1990 .367 .225 .030  .034 .069  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  -.122 -.085 .404     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .115 .078 .448     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Rebellion 1990 .119 .184 .042  .026 .042  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1991 .304 .176 .088  .029 .091  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  -.088 -.058 .570     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .188 .120 .245     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Rebellion 1991 .138 .201 .026  .032 .026  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1992 .278 .170 .100  .022 .129  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  -.048 -.033 .744     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .145 .098 .346     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Rebellion 1992 .129 .199 .027  .032 .027  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1993 .270 .170 .101  .023 .123  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  -.020 -.014 .890     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .130 .091 .382     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Rebellion 1993 .130 .207 .022  .035 .022  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1994 .150 .095 .362  -.005 .496  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  -.046 -.033 .747     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .124 .087 .407     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Rebellion 1994 .082 .132 .146  .009 .146  




In order to further analyze the relationship between language status and protest 
and rebellion on a group basis, separate regressions were performed for each of the six 
types of politicized group as categorized in the Minorities at Risk data set: 
ethnonationalists, national minorities, indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses, communal 
contenders and religious sects.  The first three are considered national peoples, defined as 
“regionally concentrated groups that have lost their autonomy but preserve some of their 
cultural distinctiveness and want to protect or reestablish some degree of politically 
separate existence;” the last three are minority peoples, “groups which have a defined 
socioeconomic or political status within a larger society and are concerned about 
protecting or improving that status”  (University of Maryland 1999, groups.html).  The 
official language speakers were not omitted from this set of analyses; all regressions in 
this set were based on the full original case selection.  Only two types of groups showed 
more than a few instances each of significant relationships:  indigenous peoples and 
communal contenders, as shown in Tables 11-14.  For indigenous peoples, the 
relationship is almost nonexistent for protest but positive in several cases for rebellion, 
following the general flow of the average results for all groups.  The results for 
communal contenders demonstrate a mixed pattern, with a negative relationship as 
expected between administrative/judicial language policy and protest in several instances,
a positive relationship in several instances between educational language policy and 
protest and a positive relationship in several instances between the language policy 




TABLE 11 Group Language Status (Indigenous Peoples only) and Group Protest 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Protest 1985 .064 .083 .635  .112 .099  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  .021 .026 .885     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  .326 .414 .029     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Protest 1985 .142 .369 .037  .108 .037  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Protest 1986 -.020 -.028 .879  -.007 .438  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  -.019 -.025 .898     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  .227 .311 .115     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Protest 1986 .067 .189 .301  -.003 .301  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Protest 1987 -.031 -.041 .829  -.049 .673  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  .013 .017 .931     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .175 .227 .255     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Protest 1987 .056 .149 .417  -.010 .417  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Protest 1988 .194 .196 .306  -.058 .734  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  -.049 -.047 .810     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  .060 .060 .761     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Protest 1988 .067 .137 .454  -.014 .454  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Protest 1989 -.099 -.145 .429  .028 .296  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  -.123 -.172 .366     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .237 .343 .079     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Protest 1989 .011 .033 .857  -.032 .857  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Protest 1990 .278 .307 .098  .041 .250  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  .015 .016 .931     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .135 .146 .439     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Protest 1990 .142 .315 .079  .069 .079  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Protest 1991 .054 .072 .705  -.065 .775  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  .047 .006 .976     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .127 .167 .402     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Protest 1991 .063 .171 .348  -.003 .348  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Protest 1992 -.156 -.189 .317  -.027 .544  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  .154 .177 .365     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .084 .100 .610     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Protest 1992 .030 .073 .692  -.028 .692  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Protest 1993 -.076 -.091 .638  -.094 .952  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  -.049 -.056 .781     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .041 .048 .812     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Protest 1993 -.026 -.063 .731  -.029 .731  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Protest 1994 -.088 -.102 .591  -.045 .647  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  .210 .232 .242     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  -.010 -.012 .953     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Protest 1994 .037 .087 .634  -.025 .634  




TABLE 12  Group Language Status (Indigenous Peoples only) and Group Rebellion 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1985 .177 .125 .503  -.044 .651  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  .039 .027 .890     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  .231 .161 .412     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Rebellion 1985 .150 .218 .222  .017 .222  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1986 .177 .125 .503  -.044 .651  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  .039 .027 .890     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  .231 .161 .412     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Rebellion 1986 .150 .218 .222  .017 .222  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1987 .177 .125 .503  -.044 .651  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  .039 .027 .139     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  .231 .161 .833     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Rebellion 1987 .150 .218 .222  .017 .222  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1988 .211 .157 .401  -.038 .613  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  .069 .049 .799     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  .180 .133 .497     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Rebellion 1988 .153 .234 .189  .024 .189  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1989 .207 .150 .409  .024 .304  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  .127 .088 .639     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .327 .233 .223     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Rebellion 1989 .223 .330 .060  .080 .060  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1990 .556 .403 .021  .164 .042  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  .123 .086 .623     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .230 .165 .348     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Rebellion 1990 .298 .444 .010  .171 .010  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1991 .490 .344 .043  .198 .024  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  .226 .153 .373     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .349 .242 .164     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Rebellion 1991 .363 .507 .002  .235 .002  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1992 .446 .310 .071  .163 .043  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  .275 .185 .294     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .301 .208 .241     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Rebellion 1992 .338 .485 .004  .210 .004  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1993 .328 .251 .137  .179 .033  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  .295 .217 .214     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .341 .258 .144     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Rebellion 1993 .321 .505 .003  .231 .003  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1994 .128 .104 .545  .124 .078  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  .274 .213 .238     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .373 .298 .104     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Rebellion 1994 .262 .436 .011  .164 .011  




TABLE 13  Group Language Status (Communal Contenders only) and Group Protest 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Protest 1985 -.567 -.654 .126  .144 .067  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  .526 .711 .021     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  -.105 -.147 .733     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Protest 1985 -.029 -.108 .564  -.022 .564  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Protest 1986 -.567 -.654 .126  .144 .067  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  .526 .711 .021     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  -.105 -.147 .733     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Protest 1986 -.029 -.108 .564  -.022 .564  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Protest 1987 -.502 -.517 .242  .066 .190  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  .531 .640 .044     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  -.094 -.117 .794     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Protest 1987 .004 .014 .940  -.034 .940  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Protest 1988 -.406 -.407 .366  .025 .310  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  .458 .538 .094     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  -.154 -.187 .683     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Protest 1988 -.022 -.071 .705  -.029 .705  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Protest 1989 -.716 -.898 .050**             .042 .254  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  .155 .228 .465     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .442 .671 .148     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Protest 1989 -.000 -.001 .998  -.034 .998  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Protest 1990 -.068 -.076 .873  -.109 .997  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  .042 .056 .868     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .028 .038 .939     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Protest 1990 .004 .015 .938  -.034 .938  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Protest 1991 -.677 -.682 .144  -.024 .524  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  .054 .063 .843     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .463 .564 .236     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Protest 1991 -.015 -.048 .800  -.032 .800  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Protest 1992 -.857 -.907 .040 ** .118 .096 * 
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  .369 .458 .132     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .507 .649 .144     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Protest 1992 .054 .183 .325   .000 .325  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Protest 1993 -1.169 -1.108 .012 ** .160 .053 * 
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  .409 .454 .126     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  .666 .764 .081     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Protest 1993 .033 .099 .596  -.024 .596  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Protest 1994 -1.387 -1.341 .002 *** .258 .011 ** 
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  .423 .479 .088     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .803 .940 .025     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Protest 1994 -.023  .070 .710  -.029 .710  




TABLE 14  Group Language Status (Communal Contenders only) and Group Rebellion 
 – Linear Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
         
Group Language Status 1984 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1985 .625 .532 .243  .012 .357  
Group Language Status 1984 – Education  -.167 -.166 .598     
Group Language Status 1984 – General  -.097 -.100 .828     
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Rebellion 1985 .094 .255 .166  .033 .166  
Group Language Status 1985 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1986 .690 .593 .183  .067 .186  
Group Language Status 1985 – Education  -.162 -.163 .594     
Group Language Status 1985 – General  -.086 -.089 .842     
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Rebellion 1986 .119 .326 .073  .076 .073  
Group Language Status 1986 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1987 .668 .572 .202  .047 .237  
Group Language Status 1986 – Education  -.164 -.164 .596     
Group Language Status 1986 – General  -.090 -.093 .837     
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Rebellion 1987 .111 .302 .098  .091 .098  
Group Language Status 1987 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1988 .658 .490 .262  .088 .144  
Group Language Status 1987 – Education  -.085 -.074 .806     
Group Language Status 1987 – General  .014 -.013 .977     
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Rebellion 1988 .162 .385 .033  .119 .033  
Group Language Status 1988 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1989 .810 .539 .198  .170 .046  
Group Language Status 1988 – Education  -.075 -.058 .841     
Group Language Status 1988 – General  .012 .010 .981     
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Rebellion 1989 .220 .467 .008  .191 .008  
Group Language Status 1989 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1990 .516 .352 .414  .104 .115  
Group Language Status 1989 – Education  -.250 -.200 .508     
Group Language Status 1989 – General  .301 .248 .573     
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Rebellion 1990 .179 .388 .031  .122 .031  
Group Language Status 1990 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1991 .169 .125 .784  -.022 .511  
Group Language Status 1990 – Education  -.365 -.317 .327     
Group Language Status 1990 – General  .397 .356 .450     
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Rebellion 1991 .072 .169 .364  -.005 .364  
Group Language Status 1991 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1992 .234 .205 .658  -.049 .662  
Group Language Status 1991 – Education  -.323 -.331 .312     
Group Language Status 1991 – General  .200 .212 .656     
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Rebellion 1992 .033 .093 .617  -.020 .617  
Group Language Status 1992 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1993 .516 .465 .319  -.044 .636  
Group Language Status 1992 – Education  -.273 -.288 .377     
Group Language Status 1992 – General  -.090 -.098 .837     
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Rebellion 1993 .029 .082 .660  -.027 .660  
Group Language Status 1993 – Adm/Jud Rebellion 1994 .335 .269 .562  -.052 .680  
Group Language Status 1993 – Education  -.372 -.350 .287     
Group Language Status 1993 – General  .130 .127 .790     
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Rebellion 1994 .022 .072 .767  -.031 .767  




 As planned, regression analyses were performed using the three central language 
policy variables and other variables which might influence protest and rebellion based on 
cultural matters:  different language from the majority, different customs, different race 
and different religious belief.  The cultural difference variables would be expected to 
have a positive relationship with protest and rebellion.  Tables 15 and 16 outline the 
results of these analyses.  Out of the language policy and cultural difference variables, the 
custom variable is the only one which demonstrates a significant relationship with protest 
and rebellion. 
TABLE 15 Cultural Variables And Group Protest 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable - Group Protest 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Language Policy           
Adm/Judicial B -.038  -.078  -.023  .130  -.034  
 Beta -.050  -.102  -.031  .149  -.046  
Educational B .014  .021  .035  -.027  -.065  
 Beta .019  .027  .046  -.030  -.087  
General B .041  .077  .021  -.105  .139  
 Beta .054  .100  .027  -.120  .189  
            
Cultural Differences           
Language B -.114  -.096  -.103  -.172  -.235  
 Beta -.071  -.059  -.064  -.093  -.151  
Custom B .146  .105  .093  .161  .095  
 Beta .165  .117  .104  .157  .110  
Race B -.086  -.110  -.076  -.110  -.081  
 Beta -.071  -.090  -.062  -.079  -.069  
Religious 
Belief 
B .023  .075  .029  .050  .105  
 Beta .024  .075  .030  .044  .109  
            
Model Adj. R2 -.022  -.023  -.040  -.010  .001  
 Sig. F .741  .746  .943  .568  .421  
            
Significant Variables           
            
 Custom – Sig. .096 *         
           




TABLE 15 (continued) Cultural Variables And Group Protest 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable - Group Protest 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  
Language Policy           
Adm/Judicial B .147  -.025  -.151  -.086  -.105  
 Beta .168  -.030  -.178  -.101  -.130  
Educational B -.071  -.055  .129  .063  .088  
 Beta -.080  -.064  .150  .007  .107  
General B .031  .131  .153  .191  .049  
 Beta .036  .155  .180  .222  .060  
            
Cultural Differences           
Language B -.437  -.274  -.278  -.252  -.104  
 Beta -.235  -.153  -.154  -.139  -.061  
Custom B .110  .108  .052  .060  .053  
 Beta .107  .109  .052  .006  .056  
Race B -.221  -.287  -.126  -.107  -.174  
 Beta -.159  -.214  -.093  -.079  -.135  
Religious 
Belief 
B .043  .058  .008  .084  .036  
 Beta .038  -.053  .007  .076  .034  
            
Model Adj. R2 .038  .023  .007  -.008  -.025  
 Sig. F .118  .204  .353  .546  .779  
            
Significant Variables:  None          
            
Number of cases =  151 
 
TABLE 16 Cultural Variables and Group Rebellion 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable - Group Rebellion 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Language Policy           
Adm/Judicial B .260  .244  .178  .179  .143  
 Beta .209  .204  .149  .152  .115  
Educational B -.125  -.117  -.108  -.138  -.124  
 Beta -.099  -.096  -.090  -.115  -.098  
General B -.051  -.050  .034  .032  .114  
 Beta -.041  -.042  .029  .027  .092  
            
Cultural Differences           
Language B .165  .134  .221  .189  .174  
 Beta .062  .052  .087  .075  .066  
Custom B .157  .131  .178  .252  .324  
 Beta .107  .093  .127  .182  .221  
Race B -.007  -.029  -.018  .086  -.149  
 Beta -.003  -.015  -.010  .005  -.075  
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TABLE 16 Cultural Variables and Group Rebellion 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable - Group Rebellion 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Religious 
Belief 
B .112  .059  .052  .053  .023  
 Beta .069  .038  .033  .034  .014  
            
Model Adj. R2 -.015  -.025  -.015  -.002  .014  
 Sig. F .635  .782  .640  .465  .279  
            
Number of cases =  151 
 
Significant Variables 
 Custom – Sig.         .023 ** 
 
TABLE 16 (Continued) Cultural Variables and Group Rebellion 
Independent Variables Dependent Variable - Group Rebellion 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  
Language Policy           
Adm/Judicial B .339  .277  .239  .235  .160  
 Beta .263  .207  .195  .198  .133  
Educational B -.228  -.200  -.155  -.112  -.104  
 Beta -.174  -.147  -.125  -.092  -.649  
General B .048  .106  .040  .030  .049  
 Beta .037  .079  .033  .025  .041  
            
Cultural Differences           
Language B .059  .077  -.215  -.198  -.144  
 Beta .002  .000  -.083  -.078  -.056  
Custom B .255  .393  .331  .309  .231  
 Beta .167  .250  .230  .220  .163  
Race B -.109  -.086  -.026  -.009  .044  
 Beta -.053  -.040  .013  -.005  .023  
Religious 
Belief 
B .029  -.047  -.087  -.082  -.184  
 Beta .017  .164  -.054  -.053  -.117  
            
Model Adj. R2 .009  .027  .009  .002  -.015  
 Sig. F .328  .178  .336  .413  .641  
            
Number of cases =  151 
            
Significant Variables 
            





Returning to the possibility of a curve as the best representation of the 
relationship under study, it is necessary to consider what type of curve would make sense 
and why.  Given the results outlined above, it would be mathematically sensible to expect 
a convex curve, with protest and rebellion increasing along with group language status or 
country language policy to some point at which protest and rebellion begin to decrease 
while language status or score continues to increase.  As there are no language status or 
policy scores below –2 and in some areas none below 0, we can expect the highest point 
of the curve to be located well into the right side of the scale. 
Mathematical expectations aside, what makes sense from a theoretical standpoint?  
Historians have commonly observed that rebellion comes not when people have nothing 
but rather when they have something which is not enough.  Perhaps the highest point of 
conflict is generated by groups who have enough political resources to be in the game but 
who have a long way to go to become major players.  Looking at it another way, a 
minority language must be recognized at a useful level in order to begin to be a political 
resource.  Once it is a resource, it may also become a source of open conflict, a plank in a 
political platform or the basis for a legal claim of discrimination.  A minority language 
speaker who is not provided a court interpreter can less easily bring a civil complaint to 
court or engage in nonviolent political action (protest) that his government will 
understand.  Children who are not taught in their native language at even the elementary 
school level may not be as likely when they reach adulthood to have the resources or the 
inclination to engage in protest or rebellion on behalf of their particular language groups.  
Recalling Leibowitz’s conclusion (1976, 463) that language restrictions are accompanied 
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by discriminatory practices in other areas, one must consider the possibility that a group 
whose language status is at the low end of the scale has little power in other matters.  
Borrowing from Maslow’s hierarchy, one could postulate that the positive relationship 
between language policy or group language status and protest and rebellion at the lower 
portion of the scale is a result of the fact that this part of the conflict is not over language 
but over basic needs.  Most pertinent is the idea that as a group gains a greater level of 
language status it also gains a greater level of involvement in the government and thus a 
greater potential for working within the system.  We may be seeing a reconciliation of 
both schools of thought – language as a resource and language as a source of conflict.  
The popularly assumed negative relationship may be appropriate only for groups who are 
well on their way up the political ladder.  The hypotheses outlined previously can be 
refined to the following: 
(1) Minority groups whose languages have a somewhat recognized status 
under their country’s language policy will have higher protest and 
rebellion scores than those with a restricted language status or with official 
language status. 
(2) Countries with language policies that exhibit a token recognition of 
language minorities will have higher protest and rebellion scores than 
those with highly restrictive or highly accommodative language policies. 
(3) Groups whose language status varies somewhat in a negative direction 
from their country’s standard policy toward minority languages will have 
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higher protest and rebellion scores than groups whose language status is 
extremely varied negatively, not varied or varied positively. 
(4) Countries whose language policies have a substantial internal variation in 
their language provisions will have higher protest and rebellion scores 
than those with no variation or a high variation. 
To test the revised hypotheses, the individual variable relationships in the first 
eight sets of regression analyses were analyzed as quadratic equation curves. By and 
large, the curved relationship appears to be a much better fit than the straight line 
estimated in standard linear regression and in fact appears to show a relationship that is 
merely masked by linear regression.  Tables 17 through 22 and Figures 1 through 21 
show the statistical results for only those independent variables that exhibited at least 
partially the expected relationship with protest or rebellion.  Notation for the significance 
level of .001 has been added to the tables due to the extent of the difference between 
these results and those outlined previously.  For instances in which a particular 
relationship changed markedly over the ten pairs of years in each set of analyses, more 
than one figure is given; otherwise one figure from each set is shown to conserve space.  
In most cases the curve is convex, as expected:  the relationship begins as a positive one 
and turns in the negative direction after a peak which is generally in the same place on 
the scale as for the others in the set.  
The group language status results are summarized in Tables 17-18 and 
Figures 1-4.  Administrative/judicial group language status shows no significant 
relationship either with group protest or with group rebellion.  Educational group 
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language status is related in the expected fashion to group protest, accounting for 5% to 
13% of the variance, but is not significantly related to group rebellion.  Groups with the 
highest observed protest scores are those whose native language is required by their 
country’s constitutions to be taught at the elementary school level but not above that, and 
this language status level is also the highest point of the curve.  General group language 
status shows the expected relationship with group rebellion, accounting for 6% to 15% of 
the variance, but is not significantly related to protest. Although high rebellion scores are 
observed at all levels of group language status, the rebellion curve peaks where groups 
have regional languages or are allowed to use their own languages for local community 
events.  The group language status indices are related in the expected fashion to both 
protest and rebellion. 
TABLE 17 Group Language Status and Group Protest – Quadratic Regression (Edu & Idx) 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Educational         
Group Language Status 1984 – Educational Protest 1985 .966 1.300 .0001 **** .085 .0006 **** 
 (sq)  -.232 -1.204 .0004 ****    
Group Language Status 1985 – Educational Protest 1986 .963 1.286 .0002 **** .086 .0005 **** 
 (sq)  -.226 -1.167 .0006 ****    
Group Language Status 1986 – Educational Protest 1987 .755 1.006 .0035 *** .055 .0059 *** 
 (sq)  -.169 -.870 .0112 **    
Group Language Status 1987 – Educational Protest 1988 1.148 1.335 .0001 **** .087 .0005 **** 
 (sq)  -.284 -1.275 .0002 ****    
Group Language Status 1988 – Educational Protest 1989 .732 .997 .0039 *** .048 .0103 ** 
 (sq)  -.170 -.895 .0094 ***    
Group Language Status 1989 – Educational Protest 1990 1.044 1.177 .0006 **** .072 .0016 *** 
 (sq)  -.243 1.057 .0020 ***    
Group Language Status 1990 – Educational Protest 1991 .850 .982 .0044 *** .050 .0091 *** 
 (sq)  -.193 -.860 .0124 **    
Group Language Status 1991 – Educational Protest 1992 1.187 1.383 .0000 **** .128 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.258 -1.162 .0005 ****    
Group Language Status 1992 – Educational Protest 1993 .972 1.120 .0010 **** .085 .0006 **** 
 (sq)  -.207 -.924 .0063 ***    
Group Language Status 1993 – Educational Protest 1994 1.123 1.381 .0000 **** .111 .0001 **** 
 (sq)  -.255 -1.211 .0003 ****    
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TABLE 17 Group Language Status and Group Protest – Quadratic Regression (Edu & Idx)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
Index
Group Language Status 1984 – Index Protest 1985 .219 .786 .0180 ** .030 .0415 **
 (sq) -.016 -.691 .0373 **
Group Language Status 1985 – Index Protest 1986 .233 .831 .0122 ** .037 .0238 **
 (sq) -.016 -.717 .0302 **
Group Language Status 1986 – Index Protest 1987 .180 .639 .0546 ** .024 .0648 *
 (sq) -.012 -.509 .1246
Group Language Status 1987 – Index Protest 1988 .248 .771 .0206 ** .025 .0578 *
 (sq) -.018 -.701 .0351 **
Group Language Status 1988 – Index Protest 1989 .195 .708 .0325 ** .029 .0447 **
 (sq) -.013 -.582 .0786 *
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Protest 1990 .289 .870 .0083 *** .051 .0080 ***
 (sq) -.019 -.708 .0309 **
Group Language Status 1990 – Index Protest 1991 .181 .557 .0932 * .025 .0564 *
 (sq) -.011 -.399 .2281
Group Language Status 1991 – Index Protest 1992 .235 .731 .0256 ** .055 .0060 ***
 (sq) -.014 -.521 .1101
Group Language Status 1992 – Index Protest 1993 .214 .657 .0450 ** .053 .0070 ***
 (sq) -.012 -.438 .1798
Group Language Status 1993 – Index Protest 1994 .229 .753 .0228 ** .039 .0207
 (sq) -.015 -.598 .0696 *
Number of cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01  ****.001
FIGURE 1   Protest Index for 1985













FIGURE 2   Protest Index for 1985












TABLE 18 Group Language Status and Group Rebellion - Quadratic Regression (Gen & Idx)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
General
Group Language Status 1984 - General Rebellion 1985 1.394 1.189 .0017 *** .055 .0054 ***
 (sq) -.326 -1.099 .0036 ***
Group Language Status 1985 - General Rebellion 1986 1.352 1.193 .0016 *** .056 .0054 ***
 (sq) -.317 -1.107 .0034 ***
Group Language Status 1986 - General Rebellion 1987 1.576 1.402 .0002 **** .084 .0006 ****
 (sq) -.365 -1.286 .0006 ****
Group Language Status 1987 - General Rebellion 1988 1.626 1.466 .0001 **** .088 .0004 ****
 (sq) -.389 -1.388 .0002 ****
Group Language Status 1988 - General Rebellion 1989 1.859 1.567 .0000 **** .106 .0001 ****
 (sq) -.434 -1.449 .0001 ****
Group Language Status 1989 - General Rebellion 1990 1.835 1.484 .0001 **** .095 .0002 ****
 (sq) -.427 -1.366 .0003 ****
Group Language Status 1990 - General Rebellion 1991 2.231 1.746 .0000 **** .132 .0000 ****
 (sq) -.527 -1.633 .0000 ****
Group Language Status 1991 - General Rebellion 1992 2.182 1.865 .0000 **** .147 .0000 ****
 (sq) -.537 -1.818 .0000 ****
Group Language Status 1992 - General Rebellion 1993 1.720 1.512 .0001 **** .093 .0003 ****
 (sq) -.416 -1.447 .0001 ****
Group Language Status 1993 - General Rebellion 1994 1.553 1.359 .0003 **** .072 .0014 ***
 (sq) -.376 -1.302 .0006 ****
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TABLE 18 Group Language Status and Group Rebellion - Quadratic Regression (Gen & Idx)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
Index
Group Language Status 1984 - Index Rebellion 1985 .290 .666 .0430 ** .025 .0573 *
 (sq) -.019 -.542 .0992 *
Group Language Status 1985 - Index Rebellion 1986 .301 .716 .0296 ** .028 .0457 **
 (sq) -.020 -.596 .0695
Group Language Status 1986 - Index Rebellion 1987 .323 .733 .0185 ** .036 .0237 **
 (sq) -.022 -.635 .0522 *
Group Language Status 1987 - Index Rebellion 1988 .289 .702 .0334 ** .022 .0704 *
 (sq) -.020 -.608 .0648 *
Group Language Status 1988 - Index Rebellion 1989 .316 .718 .0291 ** .030 .0387 **
 (sq) -.021 -.588 .0732 *
Group Language Status 1989 – Index Rebellion 1990 .269 .584 .0757 * .024 .0605 *
 (sq) -.016 -.438 .1819
Group Language Status 1990 - Index Rebellion 1991 .347 .730 .0265 ** .031 .0369 **
 (sq) -.023 -.601 .0667 *
Group Language Status 1991 - Index Rebellion 1992 .375 .863 .0088 ** .034 .0292 **
 (sq) -.028 -.802 .0147 **
Group Language Status 1992 - Index Rebellion 1993 .326 .772 .0193 ** .027 .0357 **
 (sq) -.024 -.692 .0357 **
Group Language Status 1993 - Index Rebellion 1994 .232 .545 .1001 .007 .2182
 (sq) -.017 -.481 .1464
Number Of Cases = 151 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01  ****.001
FIGURE 3   Rebellion Index for 1985











FIGURE 4   Rebellion Index for 1985










Tables 19-20 and Figures 5-9 show the language policy results.  Educational
language policy displays a significant relationship with country-level protest, accounting
for 13% to 29% of the variance.  The relationship of educational language policy to
rebellion shows to be significant at individual points but not for the curve as a whole, and
must be discounted.  The language policy index does not show a consistently significant
relationship with either protest or rebellion.
TABLE 19   Language Policy and Country Protest Score - Quadratic Regression
(Educational & Index)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
Educational
Language Policy 1984 - Educational Country Protest 1985 1.829 1.592 .0024 *** .132 .0032 ***
 (sq) -.441 -1.373 .0083 ***
Language Policy 1985 – Educational Country Protest 1986 2.030 1.738 .0008 **** .160 .0011 ***
 (sq) -.493 -1.508 .0034 ***
Language Policy 1986 - Educational Country Protest 1987 1.724 1.528 .0034 *** .138 .0026 ***
 (sq) -.402 -1.272 .0138 **
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TABLE 19   Language Policy and Country Protest Score - Quadratic Regression 
  (Educational & Index) 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Language Policy 1987 - Educational Country Protest 1988 2.492 1.919 .0002 **** .189 .0003 **** 
 (sq)  -.616 -1.695 .0009 ****    
Language Policy 1988 - Educational Country Protest 1989 2.117 1.758 .0006 **** .195 .0003 **** 
 (sq)  -.491 -1.457 .0038 **    
Language Policy 1989 - Educational Country Protest 1990 2.748 1.954 .0001 **** .239 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.644 -1.636 .0009 ****    
Language Policy 1990 - Educational Country Protest 1991 2.343 1.715 .0010 **** .161 .0010 **** 
 (sq)  -.563 -1.472 .0042 ***    
Language Policy 1991 - Educational Country Protest 1992 2.560 1.829 .0003 *** .200 .0002 **** 
 (sq)  -.604 -1.542 .0022 ***    
Language Policy 1992 - Educational Country Protest 1993 2.531 1.769 .0006 **** .185 .0004 **** 
 (sq)  -.597 -1.490 .0032 ***    
Language Policy 1993 - Educational Country Protest 1994 2.760 2.105 .0000 **** .293 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.640 -1.745 .0003 ****    
Index         
Language Policy 1984 - Index Country Protest 1985 .281 .586 .0547 * .075 .0273 ** 
 (sq)  -.016 -.315 .2968     
Language Policy 1985 - Index Country Protest 1986 .314 .644 .0338 ** .089 .0163 ** 
 (sq)  -.018 -.362 .2270     
Language Policy 1986 - Index Country Protest 1987 .283 .600 .0487 ** .079 .0236 ** 
 (sq)  -.016 -.325 .2802     
Language Policy 1987 - Index Country Protest 1988 .317 .583 .0537 * .091 .0150 ** 
 (sq)  -.016 -.279 .3510     
Language Policy 1988 - Index Country Protest 1989 .262 .520 .0804 * .117 .0059 *** 
 (sq)  -.008 -.160 .5863     
Language Policy 1989 - Index Country Protest 1990 .457 .777 .0087 *** .146 .0019 *** 
 (sq)  -.027 -.434 .1360     
Language Policy 1990 - Index Country Protest 1991 .282 .494 .1063  .060 .0474 ** 
 (sq)  -.014 -.231 .4464     
Language Policy 1991 - Index Country Protest 1992 .262 .448 .1455  .046 .0766 * 
 (sq)  -.012 -.204 .5053     
Language Policy 1992 - Index Country Protest 1993 .284 .475 .1203  .059 .0493 ** 
 (sq)  -.013 -.210 .4893     
Language Policy 1993 - Index Country Protest 1994 .288 .525 .0875 * .057 .0528 * 
 (sq)  -.016 -.277 .3638     




FIGURE 5   Country Protest Score for 1985












FIGURE 6   Country Protest Score for 1985














TABLE 20 Language Policy and Country Rebellion Score - Quadratic Regression 
  (Educational & Index) 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Educational         
Language Policy 1984 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1985 
2.221 1.133 .0368 ** .036 .1093  
 (sq)  -.618 -1.127 .0378 **    
Language Policy 1985 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1986 
2.197 1.151 .0337 ** .038 .1006  
 (sq)  -.614 -1.150 .0339 **    
Language Policy 1986 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1987 
2.185 1.147 .0344 ** .038 .1018  
 (sq)  -.612 -1.149 .0342 **    
Language Policy 1987 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1988 
2.053 1.093 .0440 ** .033 .1201  
 (sq)  -.585 -1.113 .0403 **    
Language Policy 1988 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1989 
2.230 1.153 .0333 ** .040 .0954 * 
 (sq)  -.633 -1.169 .0310 **    
Language Policy 1989 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1990 
2.053 .982 .0713 * .020 .1888  
 (sq)  -.577 -.987 .0700 *    
Language Policy 1990 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1991 
2.065 .969 .0753 * .019 .1986  
 (sq)  -.579 -.971 .0747 *    
Language Policy 1991 – Educational Country Rebellion 
1992 
1.972 1.007 .0643 * .022 .1773  
 (sq)  -.545 -.996 .0674 *    
Language Policy 1992 - Educational Country Rebellion 
1993 
2.116 1.080 .0470 ** .030 .1369  
 (sq)  -.574 -1.047 .0538 *    
Language Policy 1993 - Educational Country Rebellion 
1994 
2.125 1.045 .0546 * .026 .1543  
 (sq)  -.589 -1.035 .0570 *    
Index         
Language Policy 1984 - Index Country Rebellion 
1985 
.488 .595 .0573 * .025 .1609  
 (sq)  -.048 -.563 .0718 *    
Language Policy 1985 - Index Country Rebellion 
1986 
.482 .604 .0535 * .026 .1520  
 (sq)  -.047 -.571 .0677 *    
Language Policy 1986 - Index Country Rebellion 
1987 
.492 .618 .0480 ** .029 .1385  
 (sq)  -.049 -.585 .0610 *    
Language Policy 1987 - Index Country Rebellion 
1988 
.350 .446 .1563  .002 .3530  
 (sq)  -.036 -.441 .1613     
Language Policy 1988 - Index Country Rebellion 
1989 
.251 .311 .3253  -.014 .5901  
 (sq)  -.027 -.321 .3094     
Language Policy 1989 - Index Country Rebellion 
1990 
.369 .422 .1800  -.002 .4031  
 (sq)  -.035 -.380 .2271     
Language Policy 1990 - Index Country Rebellion 
1991 
.266 .299 .3446  -.016 .6361  
 (sq)  -.025 -.267 .3978     
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TABLE 20 Language Policy and Country Rebellion Score - Quadratic Regression
(Educational & Index)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
Language Policy 1991 - Index Country Rebellion
1992
.243 .297 .3475 -.016 .6394
 (sq) -.023 -.265 .4019
Language Policy 1992 - Index Country Rebellion
1993
.216 .264 .4039 -.017 .6472
 (sq) -.017 -.193 .5406
Language Policy 1993 - Index Country Rebellion
1994
.243 .286 .3658 -.017 .6621
 (sq) -.023 -.261 .4096
Number of Cases = 70 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01
****.001
FIGURE 7   Country Rebellion Score for 1985











FIGURE 8   Country Rebellion Score for 1985










FIGURE 9   Country Rebellion Score for 1990












Results for the country differential variables are listed in Tables 21-22 and 
Figures 10-21.  Country variation in group language status under educational policy 
shows a significant relationship with country-level protest, accounting for 13% to 25% of 
the variance, and the index variable accounts for 16% to 27% of the same. The variation 
in status under general policy shows a significant relationship with country rebellion but 
accounts for only 2% to 7% of the variance, with the index accounting for slightly less.  
The results for the country variation in group language status in the administrative/ 
judicial and general policy areas as they relate to country protest are shown simply for 
mathematical interest; although the curves show to be significant, the points on the curves 
generally are not.  A look at the graphs shows that while the curves may be 
mathematically significant they are not in the expected shape, being in most cases 





TABLE 21 Language Policy Differential and Country Protest - Quadratic Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Administrative/Judicial         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1985 1.447 1.475 .3426  .274 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.230 -.938 .5455     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1986 1.447 1.451 .3536  .264 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.230 -.923 .5546     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1987 1.382 1.435 .3770  .206 .0002 **** 
 (sq)  -.232 -.963 .5527     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1988 2.488 2.244 .1777  .173 .0006 **** 
 (sq)  -.505 -1.821 .2729     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1989 2.456 2.388 .1515  .174 .0006 **** 
 (sq)  -.506 -1.967 .2363     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1990 2.042 1.701 .3258  .100 .0108 ** 
 (sq)  -.408 -1.360 .4315     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1991 1.954 1.675 .3050  .200 .0002 **** 
 (sq)  -.354 -1.212 .4570     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1992 2.109 1.765 .2821  .192 .0003 **** 
 (sq)  -.392 -1.312 .4230     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1993 2.118 1.734 .2992  .163 .0010 **** 
 (sq)  -.401 -1.314 .4308     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – 
Administrative/Judicial 
Country Protest 1994 .963 .860 .5863  .246 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.096 -.344 .8276     
Education         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1985 1.821 1.510 .0017 *** .249 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.342 -1.079 .0240 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1986 2.018 1.647 .0007 **** .237 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.405 -1.257 .0086 ***    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1987 1.834 1.550 .0018 *** .193 .0003 **** 
 (sq)  -.374 -1.203 .0142 **    
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TABLE 21 Language Policy Differential and Country Protest - Quadratic Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1988 1.562 1.146 .0220 ** .156 .0013 *** 
 (sq)  -.279 -.780 .1153     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1989 1.569 1.241 .0147 ** .156 .0013 *** 
 (sq)  -.295 -.889 .0732 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1990 2.442 1.654 .0013 *** .144 .0020 *** 
 (sq)  -.559 -1.442 .0046 ***    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1991 1.968 1.372 .0053 *** .200 .0002 **** 
 (sq)  -.369 -.980 .0432 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1992 2.318 1.575 .0015 *** .197 .0002 **** 
 (sq)  -.475 -1.230 .0121 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1993 1.805 1.202 .0178 ** .136 .0028 *** 
 (sq)  -.346 -.876 .0810 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – 
Educational 
Country Protest 1994 2.494 1.811 .0002 **** .248 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.523 -.1445 .0026 ***    
General         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – General 
Country Protest 1985 1.209 1.162 .0903 * .179 .0005 **** 
 (sq)  -.198 -.737 .2797     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – General 
Country Protest 1986 1.238 1.713 .0940 * .147 .0018 *** 
 (sq)  -.216 -.788 .2573     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – General 
Country Protest 1987 1.578 1.545 .0274 ** .157 .0012 *** 
 (sq)  -.312 -1.179 .0890 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – General 
Country Protest 1988 1.309 1.113 .1150  .127 .0039 *** 
 (sq)  -.229 -.752 .2849     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – General 
Country Protest 1989 1.713 1.571 .0224 ** .189 .0003 **** 
 (sq)  -.329 -1.165 .0876 *    
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TABLE 21 Language Policy Differential and Country Protest - Quadratic Regression 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – General 
Country Protest 1990 1.197 .940 .2012  .047 .0736 * 
 (sq)  -.231 -.700 .3399     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – General 
Country Protest 1991 1.319 1.066 .1330  .118 .0056 *** 
 (sq)  -.229 -.714 .3118     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – General 
Country Protest 1992 1.378 1.088 .1273  .109 .0079 *** 
 (sq)  -.246 -.751 .2900     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – General 
Country Protest 1993 1.861 1.436 .0392 ** .163 .0010 **** 
 (sq)  -.353 -1.052 .1280     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – General 
Country Protest 1994 2.271 1.912 .0047 *** .234 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.457 -1.486 .0261 **    
Index         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – Index 
Country Protest 1985 .536 1.413 .0108 ** .271 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.032 -.918 .0930 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – Index 
Country Protest 1986 .662 1.719 .0025 *** .268 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.045 -1.261 .0225 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – Index 
Country Protest 1987 .654 1.757 .0022 *** .238 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.046 -1.341 .0176 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – Index 
Country Protest 1988 .559 1.304 .0253 ** .184 .0004 **** 
 (sq)  -.036 -.899 .1196     
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – Index 
Country Protest 1989 .752 1.891 .0010 *** .248 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.055 -1.483 .0085 ***    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – Index 
Country Protest 1990 .864 1.861 .0020 *** .159 .0011 *** 
 (sq)  -.069 -1.588 .0078 ***    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – Index 
Country Protest 1991 .636 1.410 .0145 ** .208 .0001 **** 
 (sq)  -.041 -.985 .0839 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – Index 
Country Protest 1992 .778 1.685 .0036 *** .215 .0001 **** 
 (sq)  -.055 -1.287 .0244 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – Index 
Country Protest 1993 .849 1.798 .0019 *** .224 .0001 **** 
 (sq)  -.062 -1.406 .0138 ***    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – Index 
Country Protest 1994 .936 2.068 .0002 **** .258 .0000 **** 
 (sq)  -.071 -1.692 .0019 ***    







TABLE 22  Language Policy Differential and Country Rebellion - Quadratic Regression 
  (General & Index) 
Variable Statistics Model Statistics 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t  Adj. R2 Sig. F  
General         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1985 
3.000 1.689 .0224 ** .062 .0439 ** 
 (sq)  -.822 -1.789 .0158 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1986 
2.298 1.329 .0738 * .038 .1022  
 (sq)  -.650 -1.453 .0513 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1987 
2.956 1.715 .0202 ** .067 .0364 ** 
 (sq)  -.815 -1.826 .0137 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1988 
2.608 1.533 .0384 ** .054 .0579 * 
 (sq)  -.729 -1.656 .0257 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1989 
2.550 1.456 .0502 * .042 .0875 * 
 (sq)  -.707 -1.556 .0364 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1990 
2.857 1.510 .0432 ** .036 .1103  
 (sq)  -.762 -1.556 .0374 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1991 
3.298 1.709 .0209 ** .062 .0435 ** 
 (sq)  -.900 -1.802 .0151 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1991 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1992 
2.658 1.500 .0449 ** .033 .1208  
 (sq)  -.702 -1.531 .0407 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1992 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1993 
2.408 1.356 .0696 * .028 .1420  
 (sq)  -.658 -1.432 .0558 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1993 – General 
Country Rebellion 
1994 
2.325 1.263 .0912 * .024 .1650  
 (sq)  -.643 -1.351 .0714 *    
Index         
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1984 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1985 
.760 1.175 .0639 * .023 .1707  
 (sq)  -.072 -1.187 .0613 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1985 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1986 
.693 1.100 .0825 * .021 .1815  
 (sq)  -.068 -1.155 .0687 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1986 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1987 
.744 1.183 .0619 * .024 .1628  
 (sq)  -.070 -1.204 .0577 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1987 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1988 
.681 1.098 .0835 * .019 .1932  
 (sq)  -.066 -1.141 .0723 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1988 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1989 
.698 1.093 .0851 * .017 .2071  
 (sq)  -.067 -1.122 .0773 *    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1989 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1990 
.891 1.293 .0410 ** .034 .1184  
 (sq)  -.083 -1.299 .0401 **    
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group 
Language Status in Country 1990 – Index 
Country Rebellion 
1991 
.768 1.092 .0853 * .017 .2072  
 (sq)  -.073 -1.122 .0774 *    
87
TABLE 22  Language Policy Differential and Country Rebellion - Quadratic Regression
(General & Index)
Variable Statistics Model Statistics
Independent Variable Dependent Variable B Beta Sig. t Adj. R2 Sig. F
 (sq) -.073 -1.122 .0774 *
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group
Language Status in Country 1991 – Index
Country Rebellion
1992
.558 .864 .1758 -.002 .3971
 (sq) -.051 -.845 .1855
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group
Language Status in Country 1992 – Index
Country Rebellion
1993
.683 1.056 .0962 * .011 .2498
 (sq) -.066 -1.102 .0828 *
Difference of Highest and Lowest Group
Language Status in Country 1993 – Index
Country Rebellion
1994
.655 .934 .1272 .012 .2498
 (sq) -.065 -.995 .1044
Number of cases = 70 Significance:  *.10   **.05   ***.01
****.001
FIGURE 10  Country Protest Score for 1985













FIGURE 11  Country Protest Score for 1988












FIGURE 12  Country Protest Score for 1991













FIGURE 13  Country Protest Score for 1985












FIGURE 14  Country Protest Score for 1990













FIGURE 15  Country Protest Score for 1985












FIGURE 16  Country Protest Score for 1989













FIGURE 17  Country Protest Score for 1994












FIGURE 18  Country Protest Score for 1985













FIGURE 19  Country Protest Score for 1990












FIGURE 20  Country Rebellion Score for 1985











FIGURE 21  Country Rebellion Score for 1985










To summarize, the following variable relationships are revealed through the
implementation of this research design:
(1) For groups whose language status is below a point on the scale which
allows them a threshold level of access to government services, protest
and rebellion are related positively to group language status in one policy
area or another.  Groups whose language status is above that point engage
in less protest and rebellion as their language status moves up the scale.
The highest point of the curve is in a different spot on the scale for each
type of language policy.
(2) Of the independent variables studied, the best predictors of country-level
protest, again in a convex curvilinear relationship, appear to be
educational language policy and the index of the difference in a country’s
constitutional provisions for the most favored language groups and least
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favored language groups within a country.  Group language status under 
general language policy is the best predictor of rebellion. 
(3) The extent by which a group’s language status is lower than that of 
minority languages in general does not generally show a significant 
relationship with either protest or rebellion and can therefore be 
discounted as having any predictive value. 
(4) Country-level protest and rebellion have a strong positive relationship in a 
linear fashion, and an even stronger relationship in a curvilinear fashion, 
to the difference in a country’s constitutional provisions for the most 
favored language groups and least favored language groups within a 
country.  The educational language policy differential is specifically 
related to protest, and the general language policy differential is 











CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
 
 Unexpected findings are exciting.  They challenge assumptions and make us look 
at the world differently.  But in order to understand more clearly the statistical results of 
this study, we have to look at what is actually being measured.  Political action may 
require a certain level of language status before it can be effectively put into motion.  
Protest is an integral part of political participation.  Groups that have a stronger language 
resource than others may feel more free to risk elements of their life not related to 
language.  The positive relationship between language status variation and protest and 
rebellion may mean that countries which specify one or more levels of recognized 
languages but make no constitutional provision for minority language in general, and 
have politicized minority groups residing in their territory, have paved the way for 
increased protest.  This does not explain, however, why rebellion does not have the same 
relationship as protest. 
 The finding of a convex curvilinear relationship between (1) language policy 
and/or its differentials and (2) protest and rebellion fits to a certain extent with Gurr’s 
earlier finding (1979: 232-237) of a convex curvilinear relationship between (1) the ratio 
of coercive control by a regime’s dissidents to coercive control by the regime and (2) 
political violence.  The lesser positive linear relationship found between language policy 
differentials and protest and rebellion ties in with Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold’s 
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finding of a positive linear relationship between systemic social frustration and political 
instability.  Although systemic frustration is defined by the ratio of amenities in a country 
(indicators of satisfaction) to literacy and urbanization (indicators of want), a comparison 
could be made using the highest group status within a country as the “want” indicator and 
the lowest as the “satisfaction” measure.  
 The literature strongly associates language and power.  That power is usually 
deemed to be held by a majority language group and is perceived as the power to control.  
But perhaps it is also the power of a minority group to engage in protest.  Several 
scholars reviewed earlier argue that language serves primarily as a symbolic resource in 
group mobilization.  Others hold that language is important to a people in and of itself.  If 
the relationship between constitutional language policy, protest and rebellion is any 
indication, both arguments are correct.  Language as a resource trumps language as an 
issue until a threshold level of that resource is obtained, after which language as an issue 
has the upper hand. 
Alternatively, it may also be that up to a certain point, nonlanguage issues are 
stronger producers of conflict than language issues.  To investigate this possibility, a 
compositional time series analysis could be used to measure the change in the importance 
of language as an issue for a particular group and to discover the associated change in 
protest and rebellion. 
 Laitin (1992, 4) sees a circular nature to the relationship between language policy 
and individual language choice:  “A state’s language policy seeks to influence, yet is a 
product of, the language repertoires of its citizens.”  Might there not be the same type of 
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relationship between language policy, protest and rebellion? Heine (1990, 179) implies as 
much in his reference to “[t]he interplay between language policy…and people’s 
reactions to it.”  After all, protest and rebellion are forms of political action, and political 
action is taken precisely for the purpose of influencing policy.  The psychological 
principle of intermittent reinforcement implies that if protest and rebellion were not at 
least occasionally successful in the attempt to influence policy, they would become less 
and less common and eventually die out.  This suggests that another avenue for future 
study would be to reverse the causal arrow assumed in the present study and examine the 
possible influence of protest and rebellion on language policy. 
Schiffman (1996, 28-30, 48-54) suggests that language policy should be 
categorized by how well it fits the language regime of a country.  Varennes (1998, 123) 
asserts that language-based ethnic tension arises from the avoidance or denial of the 
existence of language issues, claiming (Varennes 1998, 275) that language-based conflict 
generally results from a level of access for a language group which is relatively low 
considering the proportion of a country’s population that belongs to that particular group.  
Kloss’s “statistical rank order” measure of actual language use could be employed to 
compare with the language policy coding to produce a measure of policy fit.  Schiffman 
(1996, 19) also emphasizes that local policy may vary greatly from state policy, 
especially in countries with a federalist structure. 
This study involves the simplest type of language policy to examine and is meant 
to provide a basis for studies of more complex policies.  A logical next step would be to 
study regional policies within federalist systems.  From there, case studies of a few 
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countries at a time could be used to isolate provincial, municipal and other levels of 
policy and would add considerably to our knowledge of how language policy influences 
protest and rebellion and vice versa. 
The gap between policy and implementation provides another important area of 
research.  The results of this study could be confounded by a disparity between stated 
constitutional policy and actual practice as experienced by the individual members of a 
language group.  This difference almost certainly contributes error to the measured 
outcomes.  Reitzes and Crawhall (1998, 19) attribute some of this gap to a lack of 
intragovernmental coordination of language policy.  For example, while China’s 
constitution declares all languages equal, Bradley (1995, 1) observes that this idealistic 
condition is not borne out in the real world.  Instead, minority languages must be 
recognized as minority languages.  To that end, many small language groups are lumped 
into one classification and assigned one recognized language which may or may not be 
mutually intelligible with the languages of each group being consolidated. 
To measure the effect of international treaty provisions dealing with language on 
protest and rebellion, coding of international treaties containing minority language rights 
could be added to the country data set created in the current study.  Signatory information 
for these treaties is found in the same source as the current constitutional language policy 
data.  A pooled cross-section analysis using constitutional language policy data from 
historical sources would involve considerable data gathering but would make a valuable 
contribution to language policy study.  Protest and rebellion data for most or all of the 
countries coded for 1985-94 are also available for 1995-98, allowing for flexibility in 
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determining a suitable time lag between the independent and dependent variables.  
Another possibility for assessing lags in the effect of language policy and group language 
status on protest and rebellion involves calculating the number of years from a policy’s 
effective date and using either that number or an interval designation (e.g. 0-2 years, 3-5 
years, 6-10 years) as an intervening variable. 
 While the present study concentrates on mother tongue language and how it is 
affected by language policy, another area of study is that of access to other languages for 
purposes of socioeconomic betterment.  Edwards (1985, 119) argues that while “schools 
can be instruments of ethnic or nationalist policy…governments may adopt a pluralist 
stance as a way of keeping minorities subordinated while appearing to attend to their 
needs.”  This argument is in line with the opinion of many linguistic minority group 
members who oppose bilingual education in the U.S., fearing the creation or maintenance 
of a second class citizenship under the guise of ethnic cooperation.  Varennes (1998, 216) 
refers to South African citizens who consider an education in English to be an essential 
asset for their children.  Chaklader (1990, 91) records resistance to change from English 
to Bengali for educational purposes from a large portion of the population due to the 
belief that English is a necessary qualification for higher education and good jobs.  
Merging these types of situations with the current study would present a considerable 
challenge. 
Many other possibilities no doubt exist.  As the areas suggested above are 
pursued, more avenues for research should make themselves visible.  As stated earlier, 
further research should involve other independent variables in the analysis in addition to 
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the language policy variables shown here to be significant contributors to protest or 
rebellion.  It may be that the relationships found in this study will disappear into the 
effect of stronger variables, especially if those variables are highly correlated with 
language policy.  The purpose of this study of language policy, protest and rebellion was 
to test the commonly-held assumptions concerning the role of language in conflict and to 
lead the way for more empirical studies in this field.  As the research has produced as 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY COUNTRY DATA FORM 
 
Country:     Prepared by: ______ on: __/__/__ 
Date of Constitution:      New__  or Amended __    
 
Language(s) of Constitution:      
         
 1    4    
 2    5    
 3    6    
         
Official Language(s):       
         
 1    7    
 2    8    
 3    9    
 4    10    
 5    11    
 6    12    
         
National or Vernacular Languages:      
         
 1    4    
 2    5    
 3    6    
         
Other Protected Languages:       
         
 1    4    
 2    5    
 3    6    
         
"Link Language," "Language of Cultural Ties" or similarly designated language:  
         
         
         
A. Language Policy Regarding Political, Judicial 
 and Administrative Systems: 
  Coding: 
         
____ Allows use of native language for all court proceedings 4 
____ Requires interpretation in both civil and criminal cases 3 
____ Allows use of native language for federal agency proceedings 2 
____ Requires interpretation of charges and trial in criminal cases 1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Allows use of native language in court for foreigners only -1 
____ Limits legislative positions to native speakers of official language -2 
____ Limits voting rights to native speakers of official language  -3 
____ Forbids use of specific language(s) listed below or of language(s) prohibited by law -4 
        
        




CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY COUNTRY DATA FORM 
 
Country:    Year of Constitution:   Page 2 
         
         
B. Language Policy Regarding Education:    Coding: 
         
____ Provides for teaching of native language at all levels or as an open-ended right 4 
____ Provides for teaching of native language through secondary level or for teaching of 
any language in public and private education 
3 
____ Provides for teaching of native language through primary level or as a general right 
subject to national interest 
2 
____ Allows teaching of native language on temporary basis only, or protects rights under 
existing law or custom 
1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Allows native language teaching for immigrants only -1 
____ Education is given only in official language(s) -2 
____ Forbids teaching of specific language(s) listed below or of languages prohibited by 
law 
-3 
____ Forbids use of specific language(s) listed below or of languages prohibited by law  -4 
         
        
        
    
C. Language Policy Regarding Media, Employment 
 and General Matters: 
  Coding: 
       
         
____ Requires minimum amount of publication/broadcast in minority languages, declares 
all languages and alphabets equal or requires labor and private organizations to 
protect language rights 
4 
____ Requires federal/local laws to protect language rights or designates multiple official 
or national languages 
3 
____ (a) Provides for regional languages or (b) prescribes use of native language for local 
community events or personal names 
2 
____ Prohibits civil rights, human rights or employment discrimination based on language 1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Requires official language place names -1 
____ Requires official language in workplace or limits entrance to certain professions to 
native speakers of official language 
-2 
____ Prohibits use of specific language(s) or of languages prohibited by law in public 
areas or in print, recording or broadcast media or requires official language for 
personal names 
-3 
____ Prohibits specific language(s) listed below or languages prohibited by law in private 
areas 
-4 
        





GROUP LANGUAGE STATUS DATA FORM 
 
Country:       Group:  Coded by: ______ on: __/__/__ 
       
Date of Constitution:      New__  or Amended __    
         
         
A. Language Policy Regarding Political, Judicial 
 and Administrative Systems: 
  Coding: 
         
____ Either (a) group's language is official language for all court proceedings 
or (b) use of native language is allowed for all court proceedings 
4 
____ Either (a) policy provides for use of native language if prevalent in local area 
or (b) interpretation is required in both civil and criminal cases 
3 
____ Use of native language is allowed for federal agency proceedings 2 
____ Interpretation of charges and trial in criminal cases is required 1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Use of native language in court is allowed for foreigners only -1 
____ Legislative positions are limited to native speakers of official language, and group’s 
language is not official language 
-2 
____ Voting rights are limited to native speakers of official language, and group’s 
language is not official language  
-3 
____ Use of group’s language is forbidden -4 
         
         
B. Language Policy Regarding Education:    Coding: 
         
____ Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language at all levels or as an open-
ended right 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at all levels 
4 
____ Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language through secondary level or 
for teaching of any language in public and private education 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at secondary level 
3 
____ Either (a) policy provides for teaching of native language through primary level or as 
a general right subject to national interest 
or (b) group’s language is official language for education at primary level 
2 
____ Teaching of native language is allowed on temporary basis only, or rights are 
protected under existing law or custom, and group’s language is not official language 
for education at any level 
1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Native language teaching is allowed for immigrants only -1 
____ Education is given only in official language(s), and group’s language is not official 
language 
-2 
____ Teaching of group’s language is forbidden -3 
____ Use of group’s language is forbidden -4 
         





 GROUP LANGUAGE STATUS DATA FORM Page 2 
 
Country:       Group:      
    
C. Language Policy Regarding Media, Employment 
 and General Matters: 
  Coding: 
         
____ Either (a) group’s language is official language 
or (b) policy requires minimum amount of publication/broadcast in minority 
languages, declares all languages and alphabets equal or requires labor and private 
organizations to protect language rights 
4 
____ Either (a) federal/local laws are required to protect language rights 
or (b) group is one of multiple official or national languages 
3 
____ Either (a) policy prescribes use of native language for local community events or 
personal names 
or (b) group’s language is designated as a regional language 
2 
____ Civil rights, human rights or employment discrimination based on language is 
prohibited 
1 
____ No provision / To be determined by law 0 
____ Official language is required for place names, and group’s language is not official 
language 
-1 
____ Official language is required in workplace or entrance to certain professions is 
limited to native speakers of official language, and group’s language is not official 
language 
-2 
____ Either (a) use of group’s language(s) is prohibited by law in public areas or in print, 
recording or broadcast media, 
or (b) use of official language is required for personal names and group’s language is 
not official language 
-3 





LANGUAGE POLICY SCORING SUMMARY FORM 
 
Country:     Prepared by: ______ on: __/__/__ 
Date of Constitution:       
         
Country scores based on data forms:      
         
 Language policy regarding administrative and judicial systems  
 Language policy regarding educational matters  
 Language policy regarding other matters  
         
Group scores based on data forms:      
         
Group Name  Adm/Jud  Educational  General  
         
         
         
         
         


















COUNTRIES AND GROUPS 





Language Country Group Name 
EN* NM IP EC CC RS  
Australia Aborigines   x    MULT 
Benin NONE       NA 
Botswana San Bushmen   x    MULT 
Burkina Faso NONE       NA 
Kachins   x    MULT 
Karens x      Karen 
Mons   x    MULT 
Rohingya 
(Arakanese) 
  x    Burmese 
Shans x      Thai Group 
Burma 
Zomis (Chins)   x    MULT 
Bamileke     x  Bantu 
Kirdis   x    MULT 
Cameroon 
Westerners     x  English 
French Canadians x      French 
Indigenous Peoples   x    MULT 
Canada 
Quebecois x      French 
Hui Muslims      x Chinese 
Tibetans x      Tibetan 
China 
Turkmen   x    Turkmen 
Costa Rica Antillean Blacks    x   English, 
Spanish 
Côte D’Ivoire NONE       NA 
Denmark NONE       NA 
Dominican 
Republic 
NONE       NA 
Blacks    x   Spanish 
Indigenous Highland 
Peoples 




  x    MULT 
Egypt Copts      x Arabic 
El Salvador Indigenous Peoples   x    MULT 
Gabon NONE       NA 
Muslims      x Turkish Greece 
Roma (Gypsies)    x   Romani 
Black Karibs    x   Garifuna Honduras 




COUNTRIES AND GROUPS 





Language Country Group Name 
EN* NM IP EC CC RS  
Assamese   x    Assamese 
Bodos   x    Bodo 
Kashmiris x      Kashmiri, 
Urdu, Hindi 
Mizos   x    Mizo 
Muslims      x MULT 
Nagas   x    MULT 
Scheduled Tribes   x    MULT 
Sikhs x      Punjabi 
India 
Tripuras   x    MULT 
Acehnese x      Acehnese 
Chinese    x   Chinese Group 
East Timorese x      MULT 
Indonesia 
Papuans   x    MULT 
Arabs  x     Arabic 
Azerbaijanis  x     Azeri Turkish 
Baha'is      x MULT 
Bakhtiari   x    Luri 
Baluchis   x    Baluchi 
Christians      x MULT 
Kurds x      Kurdish 
Iran 
Turkmen  x     Turkmenian 
Kurds x      Kurdish 
Shi'is      x Arabic 
Iraq 
Sunnis     x  Arabic 
Ireland NONE       NA 
Roma (Gypsies)    x   Romani 
Sardinians x      Sard 
Italy 
South Tyrolians  x     German 
Jamaica NONE       NA 
Jordan Palestinians x      Arabic 
Kalenjins   x    MULT 
Kikuyu     x  Kikuyu 
Kisii     x  Kisii 
Luhya     x  MULT 
Luo     x  Luo 
Kenya 
Maasai   x    Maasai 




COUNTRIES AND GROUPS 





Language Country Group Name 
EN* NM IP EC CC RS  
Druze     x  Arabic 
Maronite Christians     x  French, Arabic 
Palestinians x      Arabic 
Shi'is     x  Arabic 
Lebanon 
Sunnis     x  Arabic 
Lesotho NONE       NA 
Libya NONE       NA 
Malawi NONE       NA 
Chinese     x  Mandarin 
Chinese 
Dayaks   x    MULT 
Indians     x  Tamil 
Malaysia 
Kadazans   x    Kadazandusun 
Mali Tuareg     x  Tuareg 
Mauritius NONE       NA 
Mongolia NONE       NA 
Mozambique NONE       NA 
Nepal NONE       NA 
Niger Tuareg x      Tamasheq 
Ibo     x  Ibo 
Ogani     x  Ibibio Group 
Nigeria 
Yoruba     x  Yoruba Group 
North Korea NONE       NA 
Ahmadis      x MULT 
Baluchis  x     Baluchi, Brahui 
Hindus      x MULT 
Mohajirs     x  Urdu 
Pashtuns (Pushtuns)     x  Pashtu 
Pakistan 
Sindhis     x  Sindhi 
Blacks    x   Spanish 
Chinese    x   Chinese Group 
Panama 
Indigenous Peoples   x    MULT 
Papua New 
Guinea 




COUNTRIES AND GROUPS 





Language Country Group Name 
EN* NM IP EC CC RS  
Blacks (Afro-
Peruvians) 
   x   Spanish 
Highland Indigenous 
Peoples 






  x    MULT 
Poland NONE       NA 
Portugal NONE       NA 
Hutus     x  Kinyarwanda Rwanda 
Tutsis     x  Kinyarwanda 
Saudi Arabia Shi’is      x Arabic 
Creoles    x   Krio (Creole) 
Limba     x  Limba 
Mende     x  Mende 
Sierra Leone 
Temne     x  Temne 
Hungarians  x     Hungarian Slovakia 
Roma (Gypsies)    x   Romani 
Somalia Issaq     x  Somali, Arabic 
Basques x      Euskera 
Catalans  x     Catalan 
Spain 
Roma (Gypsies)    x   Romani 
Indian Tamils    x   Tamil Sri Lanka 
Sri Lankan Tamils x      Tamil 
Sudan Southerners x      MULT 
Foreign Workers    x   MULT Switzerland 
Jurassians  x     French 
Syria Alawi     x  Arabic 
Tanzania NONE       NA 
Tunisia NONE       NA 
Turkey Kurds x      Kurdish 
UAR NONE       NA 
Acholi     x  Acholi Uganda 
Baganda x      Bantu 
African-Americans    x   English 
Hispanics    x   Spanish 
Native Americans   x    MULT 
USA 




COUNTRIES AND GROUPS 





Language Country Group Name 
EN* NM IP EC CC RS  
Blacks    x   Spanish Venezuela 
Indigenous Peoples   x    MULT 
Chinese    x   Chinese Vietnam 
Montagnards   x    MULT 
Yemen NONE       NA 
Croats  x     Croatian 
Hungarians  x     Hungarian 
Kosovo Albanians  x     Albanian 
Roma (Gypsies)    x   Romani 
Yugoslavia 
Sandzak Muslims      x MULT 
Bemebe     x  Bemebe 
(Bemba) 
Zambia 
Lozi     x  Lozi 
Europeans    x   MULT Zimbabwe 
Ndebele     x  MULT 
         
 Total # of Group 
Cases** 
      151 
 
*EN = Ethnonational 
NM = National Minority 
IP = Indigenous People 
EC = Ethno-class 
CC = Communal Contender 
RS = Religious Sect 
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